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 4. 
Summary 
The first aim of this study is to investigate what it takes for a nonprofit association 
(NPA) to become a legal entity, specifically regarding requirements addressing 
decision-making organs within the NPA’s organization. Secondly, since within 
the legal framework of associations there exist general principles of law, this 
study also explores which general principles of law are applicable to a general 
assembly meeting and how these general principles affect the decision-making 
process. Thirdly, this study aims to investigate what possibilities members of 
NPAs have to put forward proceedings in response to a faulty resolution. Finally, 
this study has, in a limited form, tried to look into the question of whether the 
freedom of association would affect, or be affected by, the general assembly’s 
decision-making process. 
In this essay, the traditional legal method has been utilized in order to identify the 
fundamental legal principles that are applicable to NPAs. Since there is only one 
particular law for religious associations, a law that is very limited, one can state 
that most of the legal principles applicable to NPAs are unwritten rules.  
Research has revealed that even in the absence of law there is law. The legal 
framework of NPAs consists of mandatory requirements for the NPA’s 
constitution and form of organization as well as the freedom of association and 
general principles of law. Among the general principles of law, the general clause 
and the principles of equal treatment, majority rule, and conflict of interest have 
been identified as applicable to an NPA general meeting. The analysis shows that 
in order for an association to become a legal entity in the form of an NPA, it must 
have a hierarchical structure with a board and a general assembly. The NPA must 
conduct annual general meetings or similar. It seems that the NPA must be of a 
democratic nature. Non-democratic nonprofit associations that would like to 
become legal entities should organize themselves in the form of a different type of 
association. An NPA is not at liberty to abandon majority rule. The freedom an 
association has as a legal entity to decide internal matters is, in practicality, quite 
limited. This limitation of power is, however, not perceived as a limitation by 
legal authorities but as minority protection rules designed to protect members and 
third parties. An implication of the principle of equal treatment is a profound 
protection against abuse. Moreover, probably in particular because of the more 
democratic nature of NPAs, members have extensive rights to take action against 
faulty resolutions. 
 5. 
Sammanfattning 
Det primära målet med denna studie är för det första att utreda vad som krävs för 
att en ideell förening skall kunna bli en juridisk enhet, då särskilt vad som gäller 
för den ideella föreningens beslutsorgan. För det andra utreds vilka av 
associationsrättens allmänna rättsgrundsatser som gäller för 
generalförsamlingsmöten samt hur dessa rättsgrundsatser påverkar 
beslutsprocessen. För det tredje utreds vilka möjligheter medlemmar i ideella 
föreningar har att via rättens väg överklaga felaktiga generalförsamlingsbeslut. 
Till slut utreds också, om än i  begränsad omfattning  om föreningsfriheten 
påverkar, eller själv påverkas av, kraven på generalförsamlingens beslutsprocess.  
Med hjälp av juridisk metod har allmänna rättsgrundsatser som gäller för ideella 
föreningar identifierats. Dessa rättsgrundsatser är speciellt viktiga, då det endast 
finns en mycket begränsad lag som gäller för enbart några föreningar. Därför kan 
man säga att merparten av de juridiska principer som gäller för ideella föreningar 
består av oskriven rätt. 
Forskning har visat att även när lag inte föreligger finns det lag. Det juridiska 
nätverk som omger ideella föreningar består av obligatoriska krav till 
organisationsform, stadgarnas innehåll samt allmänna rättsgrundsatser.  
Bland allmänna rättsgrundsatser har utredningen visat att generalklausulerna, 
likhetsprincipen, majoritetsprincipen samt jäv gäller för ideella föreningars 
generalförsamlingsmöten. Analysen visar att en ideell förening måste ha en 
hierarkisk organisations struktur med styrelse och generalförsamling för att kunna 
bli en juridisk enhet. Ideella föreningar måste arrangera årsmöten eller liknande. 
Det verkar också vara klart att alla ideella föreningar måste vare demokratiska. 
Föreningar som inte är demokratiska måste organisera sig i en annan form av 
sammanslutning. Ideella föreningar kan inte överge majoritetsprincipen. Friheten 
en förening har som juridisk person för att avgöra interna frågor är, i praktiken, 
ganska begränsad. Juridiska autoriteter uppfattar dock inte denna begräsning som 
en begränsning av föreningsfriheten utan kan ses som en minimumreglering 
designad att skydda medlemmar och tredje part mot övergrepp. 
Likhetsgrundsatsen ger ett omfattande skydd mot maktmissbruk. Till slut gäller 
det, säkerligen på grund av ideella föreningars demokratiska natur, att ideella 
föreningars medlemmar har vittgående möjligheter att överklaga felaktiga beslut. 
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If one takes away the visibility of rules, 
 
it might happen…. 
 
that the one who set the agenda 
 
becomes king… 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
ABL Aktiebolagslag (2005:551)  - Unless elsewise specified, the 
Company Act of 2005:551 
AD Arbetsdomstolen – The Swedish Labour Court 
AvtL Lag (1915:218) om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på 
förmögenhetsrättens område – The Contract Act of 
1915:218 
Dir. EU-direktiv  
EEC Europeiska ekonomiska gemenskapen – European 
Economic Area 
FL Lag (1987:667) om ekonomiska föreningar - Unless 
elsewise specified, the Co-operative Societies Act of 
1987:667 
FT Rättsfall från Hovrätten/fordringsrätt – Claim cases from 
the Court of Appeal  
HD Högsta domstolen – The Supreme Court 
KamR Rättsfall från Kammarrätten - Cases from the 
Administrative Court of Appeal 
LO Landsorganisationen I Sverige 
NJA Nytt juridiskt arkiv avd. I 
NPA Ideella föreningar – Non-Profit Association 
NUTEK Tillväxtverket 
Prop. Proposition – Governmental bill 
RF Regeringsformen (1974:152) – Instrument of Government 
RH Rättsfall från hovrätterna – Cases from the Court of Appeal 
RSV Riksskatteverket 
RÅ Regeringsrättens årsbok 
SKV Skatteverket 
SOU Statens offentliga utredningar - Government Official 
Reports 
SvJT Svensk Juristtidning 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In 2006, there were about 200.000 nonprofit associations (NPA) with members in 
Sweden.1 These members enjoy the liberty granted them by the freedom of association 
put down in the Instrument of Government in Sweden (RF). Under this instrument, 
members of NPAs have the right to organize themselves in ways that they find 
reasonable, to regulate their constitutions as they find necessary, and to decide in their 
own internal matters. The right to organize and decide in the internal matter of the NPA's 
own has been empathized as an argument against when the question of a possible law for 
NPA has been up for discussion.2 In fact, as of today, one finds that a written law exists 
only for religious societies and this in a very limited form. Still one find that legal 
literature advice that the legislation, case law and general principles of law that affect 
NPAs are extensive, and one is even advised very carefully to utilize the Co-operative 
Societies Act (FL). 3 However, more than one attempt to apply FLs principles analogue 
on NPAs has failed.4  
 
Relatively little literature addresses the legal conditions of NPAs. One finds assertions 
that general principles of law are applicable, but the literature is fragmented, and the 
principles are not explained. However, while many articles focus on specific principles 
(e.g., the principles of equal treatment and majority rule), not much has been said about 
the general clauses and conflicts of interest. In addition, the content and the implications 
of the principle of equal treatment, for example, seem to be unclear.5 Therefore, even if 
there were agreement in regard to which general principles of law apply, this would not 
mean that one would know what implications these principles would have for an NPA’s 
decision-making process. In fact, so few studies about the legal aspects of NPAs have 
been published that, before starting this research, I did not even know if it was 
compulsory for an NPAs to have a board, to follow a written constitution, and to conduct 
an annual general meeting. Part of this investigation had to determine whether decision-
making organs were compulsory, and if so, to identify which organs. It also turned out 
that while the literature included, in comparison, a wealth of expulsion cases, there was 
only a small amount of fragmented material that addressed the options members of NPAs 
have for taking action in response to faulty resolutions. Basically, then, this is an 
investigation of the legal conditions of NPAs in the absence of law with a focus on the 
legal framework of an NPA general assembly resolution. 
                                                 
1
 Prop. 2009/10:55, page 40 
2
 LU 1979/80:1, page 7 and 9 
3
 Nerep Erik, Kartläggning för Justitiedepartementet  2007, pages 6–7; Hemström, Carl, Bolag Föreningar 
Stiftelser, En introduktion 2010 pages 96–97 
4
 See ex. 1958 s 438 and NJA 2008 s 255 
5
 Johansson 2011, page 156 
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1.2 Aim of study 
The aim of this study is firstly to investigate what it takes for an NPA to become a legal 
entity, and this in particular in regard to requirements addressing decision making organs 
within the NPA’s organization. Secondly; seeing that within the legal frame of 
associations there exist general principles of law this study also question which general 
principles of law are applicable on a general assembly meeting and if so how would these 
general principles affect the decision making process. Thirdly, this study aims to 
investigate which possibility's members of NPAs has to put forward proceedings toward a 
faulty resolution. Finally, this study has, in a limited form, tried to look into and question 
if the freedom of association would affect, or be affected by, a general assembly’s 
decision-making process. 
1.3 Delimitations 
In this study, all NPAs that the court acknowledges as NPAs will be recognized as such; 
therefore, there will be little discussion of whether they are NPAs or not. While one can 
differentiate between democratic and non-democratic NPAs, the NPAs in this study will 
all be presumed to be democratic NPAs.6The legal framework used in the investigation is 
that which would apply to NPAs that are legal entities at the national level; furthermore, 
the legal whereabouts of economic associations or NPAs with artificial members will not 
be addressed.7 European associations will not be adressed. This thesis does not address 
fusions. Some NPAs also conduct public tasks, and in some circumstances, special 
conditions may apply to these associations. This will not be a subject of discussion in this 
paper. Another issue that deserves more attention than I can provide, and which therefore 
will not be discussed, is when a constitution has a clause stating that disputes should not 
be settled in court.8  
Expulsions will be lightly touched upon but not discussed. The question of the decision-
making powers of minors will not be addressed in this essay. In addition to what has been 
said one find that both Hemström and Nerep perceive good custom for the particular 
group of NPAs as a source of law, this will not be addressed in this thesis due to the 
insecurity involved in regard to a possible conflict with other sources of law.9 The thesis 
does not discuss situations when NPAs are affected by other laws that become activated 
when certain conditions are present. An example on activating conditions is requirements 
in regard to accounting.10  
 
                                                 
6
 Hemström, Carl, Ideella föreningar 1977, pages 23–24. This since most NPAs appear to be democratic 
organizations. Democratic organizations might be a requirement for religious organizations (see Prop. 
2009/10:55, page 148, ref. 152). The legislation emphasizes that NPAs should function as voice bearers, 
opinion leaders, and schools for democracy (prop. 2009/10:55, page 49). One can also ask whether a 
nondemocratic NPA would fulfill the requirements for receiving economic support from the government, but 
that is a different discussion.  
7 Johansson, Svante, Svensk Associationsrätt i huvuddrag 2011, pages 37–38, and 68. 
8
 See e.g. NJA 1958 s 654 or NJA 1971 s 453.  
9
 Hemstrom 2011. pages 36 and Nerep 2007, page 20 see also chapter 1:4 in this thesis. 
10
 Hemström, 1977, pages 19–20, ref. SOU 2010:90, page 410. 
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1.4 Material and method 
The methodology utilized in this thesis is traditional legal method. Legal texts, 
preparatory legislative material, directives, doctrine, and case law within the relevant 
areas of study have all been perceived as applicable sources of law and have been applied 
on the general assembly meeting.11 This is a view that might be seen as dogmatic in that 
the aim is to investigate an internal perspective on what constitutes the legal frame at a 
given time. The strength in this method compared to a more socio-legal empirical study is 
that while the socio-legal empirical method would also investigate the internal praxises of 
the NPA and the current empirical situation, these praxises nor the current situation does 
not automatically ensure that the conduct of an NPA is in accordance with its legal frame. 
The traditional legal method here utilized can be perceived as less dogmatic than a 
dogmatic analysis in that the notion of traditional legal method allows the application of 
unwritten legal principles on a “real situation”. 12 
 
The only law concerning NPAs address one kind of NPAs namely religious societies and 
exist in very limited form; this law has been addressed in 3.3. NPAs have been addressed 
in governmental bills in different instances; firstly this has happened when the intention 
of the bill was to induce a law for NPAs. Seeing that no law has been introduced it made 
little sense to me to address the whereabouts of NPAs in these bills. The whereabouts of 
NPAs have however been addressed both in preparatory work predating the Act on 
Religious Communities but also FL. This essay has aimed to include these instances in its 
fundamental theoretical base. In practicality, the main source for legal requirements for 
NPAs is case law and doctrine. Case laws were selected based upon accessibility, 
visibility, and contribution; however, seeing that in order to answer the questions posed, 
what seems most important is how the legal frame is perceived today; in this light the 
historical development of principles becomes less interesting, while the news value of a 
case rates higher. 
 
Accessibility and visibility seeing I have gone through 110 years of case law involving 
NPAs with the hope of having covered all. The selection of case law was based upon its 
level of contribution to revealing the particularity of the legal framework of NPAs as it 
could be applicable to an NPA general assembly meeting. When addressing legal 
principles this has required an investigation into the case law of other associations. 
 
Seeing the lack of written law for NPAs there was a need to rest heavily upon authorities 
among legal writers when writing this essay. When doing this, I had to identify a 
hierarchy among the writers.  
 
                                                 
11
 Claes Sandgren, Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare, Ämne, material, metod och argumentation 2011, 
pages 37–38. 
12
 The concept of Socio-legal empirical study is used to catch the Swedish meaning of the concept 
“rättsvetenskaplig metod” while dogmatic analysis reflects “rättskällelära”. Sandgren, page 38-39 ref. 
Kellgren, Jan & Holm, Anders, Att skriva uppsats i rättsvetenskap 2007, page 47 
 11. 
In 1972, Carl Hemström wrote his doctoral thesis on the subject of expulsion from NPAs. 
Hemström has since this time been active within the legal area of NPAs and is frequently 
quoted in case law. Hemström must therefore be perceived as the leading authority 
among legal writers when it comes to NPAs. Hemström has only written one book that in 
particular addressed the legal conditions of NPAs, and this was a thin book written in 
1977. He has however written several books since this time from different perspectives 
where NPAs have also been addressed.  
In 2007, Erik Nereps survey into the legal conditions of NPAs was published. Nerep 
seems, in his survey, to a certain extent to rest upon Hemström while still making his own 
conclusion. Nerep has also been perceived as a legal authority in this paper. Within legal 
literature addressing associations in general Svante Johansson, is a writer who is quoted 
by both the court but also by other legal writers. Johansson has also been perceived as an 
important legal authority. 
To some extent I have also made use of Björn Lindquist as an authority within sports 
associations. Anders Mallmén in his commentary to FL also addresses NPAs from time to 
time. I have made use of these comments. Håkan Nial and Knut Rodhe have also 
addressed NPAs even in limited form. Both of them are authorities within the legal 
framework of associations. All these I have found belong to the group of main authorities.  
 
I have also made use of legal authorities to fill in gaps or explain concepts or procedures. 
When it comes to gap filling or explanation of concepts I have first of all aimed to use the 
above legal authorities, but when specialist work has existed within the particular area, 
this has necessitated an investigation of this particular work. Among the particular 
authors consulted are Svante Johansson, who has addressed the general assembly meeting 
in particular, Ola Åhman addressing authorization and power, Jan Andersson, and Lars 
Pehrson, addressing the principle of equality and the general clauses, Carl Svenslöv, who 
has addressed the issue of freedom from liability. Daniel Stattin when discussing 
protection for minorities and the right to undertake proceedings and Nial Håkans in 
regard to faulty resolutions. These are all perceived as legal authorities and represent the 
main authors consulted in this work. By and large one can say that this essay, maps but 
also compares, what has been said in case law and legal literature in regard to the legal 
frame of NPAs that could be of relevance directly or indirectly when it comes to the 
general assembly meeting. 
 
Since a detailed discussion of each legal principle or the issues involved would take up all 
space, I cannot claim that this thesis will be exhaustive. Instead, the aim is to discuss the 
fundamental principles that surround nonprofit associations’ general assembly meetings. 
Here the main focus has been on identifying the constitutional and legal frame of NPAs. 
Thus, I recommend that those who would like to study in detail exclusions, freedom of 
association, the principle of equality, the general clauses, the majority rule, and so on 
should look for specialist literature within the given area. 
 
Upon addressing the problem of investigating a legal framework consisting of unwritten 
law there were at least two possible ways of approach. 
 12. 
First seeing a tendency of the Supreme Court and legal literature to take recourse to FL 
for analogies it might have been easier to utilize comparative legal methodology 
comparing economic associations with NPAs when investigating the frame of an NPA's 
general assembly meeting. However resorting to this method could produce a less 
trustable result seeing the need of careful consideration when utilizing FL upon NPAs 
and in addition, the frame might be more fractionate and less complete.  
 
Instead, the approach taken in this thesis is a presumption of preexisting deep principles 
and the notion that legal praxis, when translating these deep principles, takes into 
consideration the given legal figure and the prevailing situation. This is an approach that 
is more demanding than just looking for analogies, but might enable a deeper and more 
profound analysis of the legal area and the possibility of creating a more complete picture 
of reality. The minus with this approach is foremost that even if there is a certain stability 
in a legal area this might change and deviations might exist. A possible solution to this 
challenge has been to map text adopting a non-reducing perspective in order to more 
critically investigate the current situation, questioning simplifications while looking for 
coherence.13 When text was mapped conflict between expressions and rules more or less 
was explained away. Still things can and might change. This is in particular true 
considering the need to resort to analogies and logical reasoning which exist when 
addressing in particular a legal area consisting of unwritten law. Thus said it could still be 
possible to make comparisons as a secondary step, this would however require more 
space than is available in this thesis. 
 
The structure is logical but influenced by the funnel method. The funnel method has been 
applied to a certain extent in the main design, giving that it starts out broadly but goes 
from general to more particular.14 At the same time, there is logic in the chaos of 
applicable rules, since, upon the establishment of the NPA as a legal entity, it is exposed 
to some of its first applicable legal rules, rules that will affect the design and also to a 
certain extent the content of its legally binding constitution. 15  
1.5 Outline 
Because of the particularity of NGAs, chapter two, after a simple general historical 
introduction, address the particularity of the NPAs constitution investigating its role in 
the absence of law. Chapter three then goes on to address what must be in a given NPA’s 
constitution in order for the association to become a legal entity. Chapter four investigate 
if the general principles of law already existing within the legal frame of associations are 
also applicable to NPAs. This chapter also looks into how these principles affect NPAs 
decision making, and this in particular when it comes to general assembly meetings. 
Chapter five addresses errors in conduct and proceedings at the general assembly meeting 
while chapters six addresses in particular the general assembly meeting, wraps up and 
concludes. 
                                                 
13
 Dalberg-Larsen, Jørgen, Seks opfattelser af retspolitik (web), ref. Sandgren, page 14.  
14
 Jensen, Ulf el al..: Att skriva juridik, Regler och råd 2012, page 23. 
15
 Ibid, page 24. 
 13. 
2. Associations and their legal 
framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts by in large addressing associations in general, then narrow down to the 
group of associations consisting of economic and nonprofit associations in order to lastly 
focus on the particularity of nonprofit associations and their constitution.   
In this thesis, “the legal framework of association” is used as a general term to describe 
the legal area of a number of different types of companies and organizations, which all 
share some fundamental commonalities.16 
2.2 About associations in general 
Firstly, an association must be based on a voluntary agreement, often between two or 
more people, about pursuing a mutual aim.17 Legally, this is a kind of standard contract 
where the Contract Act (AvtL) (1915:218 ) is applicable. This agreement can be for a 
certain time or for an undefined period of time. For some association types, the agreement 
needs to be formalized in writing in order for the association to exist, while for NPAs, 
Hemström advise that this not always applies.18 One might question if Hemströms 
perception in this matter might be derived from Arsell who stated that NPAs that were 
not legal entities could have verbal constitutions.19  
Secondly, generally, associations, whether they be companies, economic associations, or 
NPAs, need either natural or legal entities as members.20 For some association types, the 
members will contribute funds and in return receive either shares or partnerships. 
Examples of these types of associations are limited companies, limited partnerships, trade 
partnerships, and economic associations.21 
 
                                                 
16
 Johansson 2011, pages 19 and 31.  
17
 Ibid, pages 32–33. Exceptions exist, e.g., a limited company with one person, or the fact that under present 
legislation, an economic association has to consist of a minimum of three members. See also chapter 2.2.3. 
18
 Mallmén, Anders, Lagen om ekonomiska föreningar, En kommentar 2002, page 56 and Johansson 2011, 
pages 33–34; 38 and 68 and Hemström, Carl, Organisationernas rättsliga ställning, om ekonomiska och 
ideella föreningar 2011, page 22. Also worthy of notice is that Swedish law does not differentiate between 
commercial and civil law organizations; ref. Hemström, Carl, Corporations and Partnerships in Sweden, 
1995. 
19
 Arsell, O.H., Utkast till Lag angåande ideella föreningar 1919, page 67; Hemström 2011, page 23. These 
thoughts seem to agree with SOU 2010:90, page 57. 
20 Johansson 2011, pages 31–32; Hemström 2011, page 22; and Mallmén, page 35, and 56. 
21 Johansson 2011, pages 23–32.  
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Thirdly, members of associations are in principle entitled to manage the association’s 
affairs and can appoint, supervise, and empower an administrative body, most often the 
board, which will act as an instrument through which the association’s activity will be 
performed. In principle, members of associations can also change the structure of the 
organization and even dissolve it to benefit from its resources.22 
Limited companies, limited partnerships, and trade partnerships are so-called closed 
associations, while both economic associations and NPAs are in general seen by legal 
writers as examples of open associations.23 An open association is an organization 
without a fixed membership; that is, the number of members can vary, and this variation 
does not require acceptance from all members or a change in the bylaws/constitution or 
legal structure, as it does with closed associations.24  
 
In the rest of this chapter, the term “association” is, depending on the context, used to 
denote either an economic association or a nonprofit association. 
2.3 Economic associations 
In order to differentiate between economic associations and NPAs, one can start by 
studying the aim of the association. If the aim is to promote the members’ economic 
interests through commercial activities, then normally that would be an economic 
association, in accordance with FL 1:1.25 However, as one will see, this does not always 
apply, since economic associations can have more than one goal; for example, an 
economic association can aim to promote the members’ economic interests but also have 
not-for-profit aims, thus engaging in both commercial and voluntary activities.26 
The legal literature classifies commercial activity as commercial, industrial, financial, or 
some other type of businesslike, organized activity. Here the activity is the method 
utilized to meet the association’s goal, and it must be of a continual nature. Still, history 
shows that it does not require too much commercial activity in order to be able to register 
as an economic association.27 
The legislation defines an economic association as a cooperative that does not look to 
promote its own interests but rather to promote the members’ economic interests.28  
Economic interest can be gained by bringing down members’ expenses, increasing 
income, or even by preventing or limiting future cost increases, that is, decreasing living 
or work expenses.29  
                                                 
22
 Giertz, Magdalena, Ideella föreningar en översikt 2012, chapter 3, Melin, Stefan, Associationsrätt 2010, 
page 119 and Johansson 2011, page 31. 
23
 Johansson 2011, pages 38–39. While it is true that, technically, the number of members in a limited 
company can change, what does not change is the actual number of shares. Here, the membership is a fixed 
number of shares and not shareholders; ref. Rodhe, Knut, Föreningslagen, 1987 års lag om ekonomiska 
föreningar, 1988, page 16, Hemström 1977, page 10 
24
 Johansson 2011, pages 37–39; Rodhe, page 17; Hemström 2011, page 14; Malmsten, Krister och Pallin, 
Christer, Idrottens föreningsrätt 2005, page 17. 
25 Hemström 2011, page 13; Mallmén, pages 35-40. 
26 SOU 2010:90, page 381, NJA 2000 s 365. 
27 Mallmén, pages 39–40; see e.g. NJA 2000 s 365. 
28
 Mallmén, pages 36–37, Prop. 1986/87:7, page 59. 
 15. 
The first law that regulated economic associations appeared in 1895.30 At this time, if any 
insignificant commercial activity existed within an association, it could be incorporated 
as an economic association.31 Thus, no clear distinction between economic associations 
and NPAs appears to have existed.32 The 1895 law consisted of only a few sections, and 
even the next law (1911:55) was limited and left associations to regulate themselves 
through constitutions, even in such important matters as accounting and capital 
formation.33 
In 1951, law was introduced that separated this form of association of cooperative activity 
and expanded the regulations, following in many ways the pattern of the Swedish 
Company Act (1944:705).34 With the Co-operative Societies Act (1951:308), a definition 
was implemented that more clearly separated economic associations from companies and 
NPAs. Also in 1951, a prerequisite was introduced requiring that members should 
participate in the organization’s activity in one way or another, whether this be as 
consumers, producers, or workers. It was made clear that it was the members’ economic 
interests, and not any other interests, that should be promoted through the association’s 
activity.35  
The present Co-operative Societies Act (1987:667), which came into effect on January 1, 
1988, enabled associations that were registered according to the 1895 or 1911 association 
laws to remain as economic associations, even if they did not fulfill all of the 
requirements and might today be considered NPAs.36 Today even if an NPA fulfilled the 
requirements for incorporation as an economic association, the NPA would have 
significant freedom to decide whether or not it wanted to be an economic association 
seeing that economic associations that have mixed aims can still be accepted as economic 
associations under the condition that the association’s main aim or activity is to promote 
the members’ economic interests. 37  By “main,” the legislators seem to mean more than 
half; however, this might not represent an absolute demand.38 
Today there are a number of so-called “social” companies that might have one or more 
aims that are not-for-profit. These aims could be main aims, such as integrating people 
who have difficulties in keeping a job, or providing care for old people. None of these 
would need to have a profit goal. In 2008, there were about 150 social companies in 
Sweden. One estimate is that about half of these exist in the form of economic 
associations, and the rest are registered as NPAs.39  
                                                                                                                                     
29
 Mallmén, page 36 and Hemström 2011, page 16. 
30 That is, not to this writer’s knowledge. 
31
 Mallmén, page 39. 
32
 Johansson 2011, page 29, and Prop. 1986/87:7, page 75 See, for an example, NJA 1898 s 196, where the 
court found that a mission association without a constitution was similar to an economic association that had 
not been registered; see also RÅ 1921 s 215. Both of these indicate the wide perception of the economic 
activity needed to become an economic association. 
33 Prop. 1986/87:7, page 74-75. 
34
 Johansson 2011, pages 28–29. 
35
 SOU 2010:90, page 294 ref. Mallmén, page 41. 
36
 Ibid. See e.g., Folketshusföreningar. See also Hemström 1972, Uteslutning ur ideell förening, pages 45–52, 
in regard to the similarities between cooperatives and NPAs. 
37
 NJA 2000 s 365, page 371, ref. SOU 2010:90, page 23, 359; Mallmén, page 50. 
38
 Mallmén, page 50; see also prop 1999/2000:88, page 13, 18 and 7.  
39 Ibid, pages 382–383; NUTEK, Programförslag för fler och växande sociala företag, page 21. 
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It is with this problem in mind that I hesitantly proceed into the discussion of NPAs, well 
aware that technically, some of the organizations recognized as NPAs by the Swedish 
Supreme Court might in fact be economic associations, and others who perceive 
themselves to be economic associations might be NPAs in the eyes of the court.40 
2.4 Nonprofit associations 
Basically, an NPA is an association that does not fulfill the two main requirements 
needed to become an economic association in accordance with FL 1:1, namely either 
having an economic aim or engaging in commercial activity. This should imply that no 
NPAs are able to fulfill the requirements of an economic association. In reality, however, 
as economic associations, NPAs can also have more than one aim and may engage in 
different types of activities, some of which may be economical in nature.41 There does not 
appear to be a clearly defined border to tell when an aim or activity is so dominant that an 
NPA becomes an economic association.42 In addition one might question whether there is 
a tendency to see economic associations that have not been incorporated as NPAs, instead 
of unincorporated entities.43 
 
The legislation differentiates between three different types of NPAs. Firstly, there are 
NPAs that do not use commercial activities to accomplish their objectives. The 
organizations in this group are seen as “pure NPAs.” In this group, one finds religious 
societies, political parties, social associations, sports organizations, charitable 
associations, and more.44 
 
Secondly, there are associations that pursue their nonprofit aims through commercial 
activity. In this group one can find student organizations and different cultural 
organizations. These associations might, to a certain extent, also be seen as pure NPAs.45 
 
Lastly, there are organizations that promote their members’ economic interests but do not 
try to achieve this through commercial activity. In this group one finds labor market 
organizations, trade associations, employer associations, tenant associations, and more.46 
 
                                                 
40
 For an example, see NJA 1977 s 129. Then again, one can question whether it is possible for a govermental 
institution to know that an economic association in fact is an economic association. See Hemström, Carl, 
Festskrift till Gunnar Karnell 1999, page 280. 
41 Hemström 2011, page 22 and Hemström 1977, pages 20–21; ref. Rodhe, page 17. 
42 See chapter 2.1. 
43
 See NJA 2000 S 365, NJA 1998 s 717 and NJA 1998 S 293. See also NJA 1977 s 129, where a trade 
association claimed to the Court of Appeal that it was a nonregistered economic association, and as a 
consequence could not stand trial. The Court of Appeal stated that since the trade association did not fulfill 
the requirements of an economic association with respect to its commercial nature, it was an NPA.  
44
 Prop. 2009/10:55, page 10, ref. Prop. 1997/98:116, page 18 and Prop. 2009/10:55, page 12, where it is 
made clear that despite the new Act on Religious Communities, religious societies are still seen as NPAs. 
45 Prop. 2009/10:55, page 10. 
46 Hemström, 2010, pages 96–97; Mallmén, page 57; Rodhe, pages 17–18; Hemström 2011, page 21. See also 
Malmsten and Pallin, page 17. 
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2.4.1 Nonprofit associations legal conditions 
While economic associations were isolated and regulated through particular laws, NPAs 
were left “unregulated,” in that they did not get their own law.47  
In both 1910 and 1911, if one tried to find a regulation that shared some similarities with 
the law governing economic associations, they would not have succeeded. One of the 
reasons for this was that some NPAs were concerned that a particular law would make it 
difficult for them to work in accordance with the best interests of their organizations.48 In 
1938, the question of a particular law for NPAs came up for discussion again, but still no 
law was agreed upon.49 In 1949, there was a discussion about whether NPAs could 
register themselves as economic associations if they so desired. The thought behind this 
was that the organizations might desire the possibility of using the particular legal 
framework of economic associations.50 Nothing really came out of these discussions, as 
the option was left out of governmental bill that was presented in 1951.51 However, the 
discussion did not end in 1951 but has continued throughout the years. 
 
Today, instead of there being direct, applicable law regulating NPAs, the legal frame of 
NPAs came to consist of case law, doctrine and analogies deducted mainly from FL.52   
Seeing the similarities in nature between economic associations and NPAs it might be 
tempting to rest heavenly upon analogies based upon FL but the supreme court in NJA 
1958 s. 438 made clear that analogies with FL must be done with a certain carefulness;  
that is with consideration to the particular conditions and the situation in question.53It is 
made clear that in some conditions one should instead look for e contrario inferences. 54 
Still seeing that an NPA’s organization, with general assembly meetings and a board, 
resembles that of economic associations, Johansson finds it natural that the rules 
governing decision-making procedures for general meetings in FL also are largely 
analogue applicable to NPAs.55   
 
                                                 
47 There is not enough space here to go deep into the history of how the legislators have tried to put forward 
suggestions with respect to laws for NPAs, but for those interested, see Augustsson, Oscar, Ideella föreningar 
– i princip orörda av ”juridikens döda hand” – när blir de juridiska personer?– 2008; see also Arsell, section 
7–10, the oldest (in recent times at least) example of a law regulating the annual general meeting. Here one 
can, for example, recognize principles such as the majority principle, the equality of status principle, and 
conflict of interest.  
48 Hemström 1977, page 18. 
49 Ibid, page 19. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Hemström 1977, pages 14 and 19; Hemström, pages 96–97; Rodhe, page 18. Rodhe emphasizes the large 
variation in NPAs: some are religious, some are related to sport, and so on. Rodhe also points out the lack of 
interest from labor organizations in having their freedom limited. While Hemström informs us that political 
parties, which also fall under the label of NPAs and which sometimes are connected with labor organizations, 
do not want regulation.  
52
 NJA 2008 s. 255 and NJA 2013 s. 233 ref. Smiciklas, Associationsrättens grunder, bolag, föreningar och 
stiftelser 2012 page 169, ref. Hemström 2011, pages 35-38,  Nerep 2007, page 18-20 and Johansson 2011, 
page 162-163 
53
 NJA 1958 s.438 
54
 See Hemström 2011, page  37 and Nerep 2007, page 18-19 
55 Johansson 2011, page 189.  
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However it seems to this researcher that one should instead investigate if there are general 
fundamental principles which guide what should apply for NPAs, but also how and when 
this would apply. This line of thought could be in line with the prevailing view within 
doctrine giving that general principles of law applicable on other associations also are 
applicable on NPAs.56 In fact, Nerep makes clear that NPAs are affected by general 
principles of laws, in the same way as all other legal entities.57Chapter four in this essay 
will therefore address general principles of law. In addition to what has been said one find 
in legal literature that the NPA’s constitution supplemented by internal customs 
constitutes a legal frame, this is what chapter 2.4.2 will look into while chapter three 
investigate requirements to the constitution upon the NPA becoming a legal entity.  
2.4.2 The importance of the constitution 
Within the legal framework of associations there is a generally accepted understanding 
that an adopted constitution functions as a legal frame for association organs’ actions or 
resolutions and that this also applies for NPAs.58 The constitution is seen as an agreement 
between the members and the association, and to break it can lead to decisions being 
annulled and/or claims for damage being issued if the corporate veil has been broken. 
In practical terms, an NPA or one of its members can file claims both in accordance with 
FL 7:17 analogue but also directly based upon a breach of AvtL 1:1. FL 7:17 requires 
membership at the time of the claim, while breaches of AvtL 1:1 do not. In expulsion 
cases, AvtL section 36 and the Discrimination Act (2008:567) chapter 2 section 11 can 
also be activated (see also 5.2 below).59 
2.4.2.1 Deviation from the constitution 
Among else, the question of an NPA’s right to deviate from the constitution was up for 
discussion in NJA 1958 s 438. This case addressed the general assembly’s authority 
within the rules of the constitution to establish a new section that had rules deviating from 
the parent association and, if it had that authority, whether the members who were 
automatically assigned to the new section were bound by these rules.  
In this case, two members, B.E. and N.E-d., filed a claim against a trade association in 
which they were both members. The reason for the claim was that the trade association, 
here Sveriges handelsträdgårdsmästareförbund, in its constitution section 24, had secured 
its right to establish new sections of horticulturists within the trade association and to 
assign members automatically upon belonging.  
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 Hemström 2011, pages 37-38,  Nerep 2007, page 20-21 and Johansson 2011, page 162-163 and Smiciklas, 
page 169. 
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 Nerep 2007, page 20 
58 Johansson 2011, page 155 and 163 and Hemström 2011, page 48 
59 NJA 1973 s 355 and NJA 1998 s 717 and 1998 s 293; Hemström 2011, pages 110–111, 135; ref. Mallmén, 
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A new horticultural section was established with a deviating constitution in November 
1952. Both B.E. and N.E-d. stated that the constitution of the new horticultural section 
had consequences that were serious. Among them was a rule that stated that the 
membership period was five years and that membership automatically renewed unless 
terminated one year in advance. Furthermore, disagreements were to be settled by the 
arbitrary court, and there were issues with quotas and import control. 
In its evaluation, the Supreme Court looked into whether the members could have 
expected such a deviation from the constitution upon becoming members. Since there 
were no rules regulating exclusions in this association, this was a relevant question. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the members could not have expected such a deviation 
from the constitution upon becoming members.60 
2.4.3 The constitution and the purpose 
Johansson states that neither NPAs nor other associations can undertake actions that are 
clearly foreign to their aims or their objectives for operations. This principle might apply 
to all the organs of the NPA, thus whether that is the general assembly, board, or 
managing director, these cannot issue resolutions, prescripts, or orders that are clearly 
foreign to those aims or directions, that is, unless all members of the association agree to 
this.61 
 
The principle of adhering to the purpose was visible in the previous Co-operative 
Societies Act (1951:308), section 20, which stated that a general assembly must not use 
profit or other means nor take on a responsibility that is clearly foreign to the 
association’s aim which also reflects the words of Johansson. Today one finds this 
principle in the present Co-operative Societies Act (1987:667) 7:17.62 
 
A possible “worst case” scenario of making a decision against the registered purpose of 
the association and acting upon it could be quite serious; one could get into a situation 
similar to “piercing the corporate veil,” where the assembly becomes personally liable.63 
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 NJA 1958 s 438; please see 3.1 for more details. 
61 Johansson 2011, pages 145, 156 and 163, and Andersson and Pehrson, 2008, page 110 ref. 121; see also 
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2.4.3.1 When actions undertaken are foreign 
There exist at least a few cases involving an NPA where the question of whether the 
action undertaken was foreign. 
In NJA 1987 s 394, the question of whether a general assembly resolution was against the 
NPA’s purpose, as written out in the constitution, was up for discussion. The case was a 
dispute between Henrik A., three more members and a Swedish electrician labor market 
organization in regard to the assembly’s right to sign the members up for obligatory home 
insurance, at a total cost of about 3–4 million, or 160 SEK per member, per year. Here, 
the Supreme Court referred to legal literature implying that in order for a general 
assembly resolution to be seen as against the NPA’s purpose, the decision taken by the 
general assembly must be clearly foreign (FL section 50, 1951 act. analogue) to the 
NPA’s stated aim.64 
When evaluating whether the decision taken was clearly foreign, the Supreme Court 
looked into how the NPA understood its purpose and how it had been understood 
historically by the general assembly, both in connection with the session in question and 
before it. In this case, it had been part of the NPA’s previous praxis to sign members up 
for obligatory insurance deals with the intention of saving monies; therefore, this praxis 
could be seen as a development of a collective understanding of the given constitution in 
question, and with that, perhaps an approval and mutual understanding.65Thus, the NPA’s 
activity had developed over time, expanding from traditional labor market organization 
activity to aiming at improving members’ economic status, and the decision of obligatory 
home insurance became an attempt to indirectly increase economic status, since it was 
likely to be cheaper to sign up all of the members rather than making the home insurance 
a matter of choice. Home insurance could then be seen as promoting work performance 
indirectly. Also, the insurance fee was very low per member. While the Supreme Court 
doubted that the decision made by the general assembly was in agreement with the NPA’s 
aim, the court felt that it could not be said that it was clearly foreign to the NPA’s aim.  
It should also be pointed out that the labor market organization’s board made a decision 
in August 1986 (that is, before a decision was made in this case by the Supreme Court) 
that gave all members the right to choose whether or not they wanted the home insurance 
under dispute.66 
The question of actions clearly foreign has been discussed in other cases involving other 
types of associations. In one of the cases, NJA 2000 s 404, which will be more 
thoroughly discussed in chapters 4.3 and 4.5, it was made clear that removing the 
company’s assets and making it unable to pursue future profitable commercial activities 
was clearly foreign to its purpose.  
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 NJA 1987 s 394, ref. Johansson 2011, page 156. 
65 NJA 1987 s 394, ref. Johansson 2011, page 62, ref. Mallmén, pages 86–87 and Hemström 2011, pages 13, 
22.  
66 NJA 1987 s 394. 
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The decision in NJA 2000 s 404 in part reflected NJA 1967 s 313, where a general 
assembly made the decision to dissolve the company without the consent of the 
minority.67 
2.4.4 Summary - constitution, part of a legal frame 
The constitution of an NPA participates in forming a legal frame around the NPA’s 
general assembly meeting. Giving that the mandatory requirements for the constitution 
addressed in chapter 3 together with other rules and regulations applicable forms a border 
for the NPAs decision makers. The general assembly cannot cross this border without 
breaking a legal rule.  
This principle became visible in NJA 1958 s 438 in that the trade association could not 
automatically assign members to a new section with stricter terms and more far-reaching 
conditions than what the members could have expected upon entering the trade 
association in the first place. The general assembly was neither free to establish a new 
section with deviating constitution nor automatic assign members to the same. In this 
case, it was clear that the general assembly had to stay within the line of its own 
constitution. 
However in NJA 1987 s 394 one finds that the understanding of the aim can develop. To 
a certain extent, the aim can even change over time, but it does not seem plausible that 
this can happen to the extent of closing down operations without the consent of all 
members, in accordance with NJA 2000 s 404. Thus, if an NPA has more than one aim, it 
should accordingly imply that closing down either one of its objectives for operations 
and, or, the pursuing of one or more aims should require the consent of all members.  
Otherwise, it seems that what is clearly foreign to an NPA’s purpose should be evaluated 
from case to case and that with considerations to use of capital to pursue a clearly foreign 
goal, and still a possible quiet consent from members following a general assembly that 
has acted upon the change of aim might heal certain deviations from an NPA’s aim by 
members’ quiet consent. 
NJA 1958 s 438 made clear that members of NPAs enjoy some minority protection, in 
that the decision to deviate from the constitution was made by a majority of the general 
assembly. In its evaluation, the Supreme Court pointed on to the necessity for member 
conditions to not deviate from what could be expected by members upon them joining the 
association. 
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2.5 The freedom of association and NJA 1958 s 438 
The right to join an association is protected by RF 2:1, p. 5, which states that all Swedish 
citizens have a fundamental right to establish or join an association and work within the 
frame (constitution) of the association.68 This right is also given to foreigners visiting the 
country, in RF 2:22, p10, 1st.69  
Nerep questioned if the right to form a legal entity follows directly the freedom of 
association but concluded that the freedom of association can be perceived as a right to 
unite in “legal entity” figures provided by the legal system giving that the government 
should provide legal entities which enable the possibility to exercise the freedom of 
association. He states that limitations in form of mandatory requirements to the 
constitution of an NPA in regard to becoming a legal entity cannot be said to limit the 
freedom of association. 70 This is in line with the lawgiver who perceives the legal 
requisites put down in laws for economic associations and companies as a legal frame for 
those who would like to utilize a particular legal construction and thus limit members’ 
liability for dept.71 The freedom members of an association have to establish associations 
and organize themselves will however have to be limited by necessary demands for 
protection of members, third persons and the society. This freedom can only be limited in 
order to protect society from military groups and movements that persecute ethnic groups 
and so on.72 
In RF, chapter 2, section 2, one finds that a person is not to be forced by the government,  
municipalities or employees of the same to join an association. A more clear right not to 
join, even when the force involved is not from the public sector, is contained in United 
Nations’s (UN) declaration of human rights. Here, one finds in article 20:2 that nobody 
can be forced into joining an association, which also means, according to the Supreme 
Court, that the right to leave an association must also be guaranteed.73 This article is 
emphasized in the European convention of November 4, 1950, in regard to protection for 
human rights, article 11:1, where an unspecified right to join an association is guaranteed. 
Here one can assume that since the section is based on the UN declaration of human 
rights, it must follow that the meaning stays the same. This is made clearer when one 
considers that in the Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
freedom to join an association also implies that one has the right to choose not to join an 
association or group, and with that, also has the freedom not to join a labor market 
organization.74 The principle of freedom to join or not to join also seems to apply in 
situations activated in the transformation of organizations by constitutional change.75 
 
 
                                                 
68 Prop. 1975/76:209 s 144; see also FT 3305-12 where the Court of Appeal states that this is a general rule 
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NJA 1958 s 438, addresses both a member’s right to leave and member’s right not to join 
an association. In September 1953, the general assembly updated the main organization’s 
constitution section 24, which, among other things, thereafter stated that those members 
who imported or grew bulbs must be members of the new horticultural section. The 
decision was thereafter published in the membership magazine, where it was also made 
clear that those members who belonged to, but would not like to be members of, the new 
horticultural section could withdraw their membership. 
B.E. and N.E-d. withdrew their memberships in May 1954 and March 1955, respectively. 
Both B.E. and N.E-d. denied that they were members of the new section.  
In this particular case, there were no rules in the main organization’s constitution that 
gave the members the right to leave the trade organization, while the constitution of the 
new horticultural section said that they were members for a minimum of five years.  
In this situation, the general assembly applied FL (here section 68 in the 1951 act), which 
gave members who did not support a change of constitution the right to leave an 
association. Therefore, one question was whether an NPA in this situation could use FL’s 
rules, which limited a member’s right to leave, in that the members who did not consent 
had to notify the association within one month after the decision was made and then leave 
the association altogether. 
NJA 1958 s 438 is famous for one single sentence: “One must be very careful when 
applying the fundamentals put down in the Co-operative Societies Act to NPAs.”76 One 
can question whether the negative freedom of association had an impact on why the 
Supreme Court emphasized the need for caution in this case. This is visible in a sentence 
uttered by the Supreme Court in the judgment, where they stated that “The actual 
membership should be based upon an individual’s will to join.” 77 
The problem of negative freedom of association is also discussed in NJA 1982 s 853. In 
1979, Christian J and Co. terminated in writing their membership in the Swedish 
municipal workers association, but the labor market organization did not allow them to 
leave. The labor market organization found their right to stop a member from leaving in 
section 10 mom 2 of their constitution, which at the time stated that a member could 
submit a written application to their labor market organization section’s board, who 
would present the termination request with a recommendation to the unions board. The 
board of the labor market organization would thereafter either grant or deny the member 
their right to leave. If the member in question did not agree with the labor market 
organization board’s decision, they could appeal to the labor market organization meeting 
within 30 days, in accordance with section 10, mom 5.78 
                                                 
76 NJA 1958 s 438. 
77 See also Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, judgement of 30th June 1993, series A, No. 264 and Nerep 
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78 According to Lena Andersson of Kommunal, Stockholm, this was Kommunal’s “old” union meeting, 
which consisted of elected representatives and union employees. The “old” union meeting was empowered to 
make decisions in regard to daily activities in between general assembly meetings, where more serious 
questions, like changes to the constitution, were addressed. At this time, Kommunal’s general assembly met 
every fifth year, while the “old” union meeting had the power to address issues that could not wait. Today, 
the union meeting consists of the same delegates, who are elected for the general assembly, but its tasks are in 
principle the same. Phone conversation, December 18, 2013. 
 24. 
If, however, the member in question did not agree with the labor market organization 
meeting’s decision, they could settle the matter in an arbitrary court whose majority of 
judges, in the case of disagreement, was to be selected by the labor market organization.79 
 
Also, in this case it seems that the main question addressed by the Supreme Court was 
deeply connected with negative freedom of association. The Supreme Court made a 
reference to the LO, which made it clear that “The principle perception within Swedish 
unions was that there existed no right for a member to leave a labor market organization.” 
The Supreme Court questioned whether the clause put down in the constitution, referring 
a member to present their case in an arbitrary court in order to leave the labor market 
organization, was in reality a right to leave or not. The Supreme court found in this case, 
with support from AvtL section 36, that the rule in the constitution stating that disputes 
should be settled by an arbitrary court and not a court of general jurisdiction was unfair.80 
2.5.1 The freedom of association and the constitution 
The freedom of association provides individuals with a right to join and establish the 
association of their liking. This freedom does not however seem to provide individuals 
with a right to establish a legal entity while ignoring the mandatory rules for legal 
entities. The freedom of association is limited by the need to protect society and do not 
seem to provide NPAs with the right to organize themselves without adhering to rules 
aimed at protecting members and third parties.  
The freedom of association can be understood as requiring that all associations keep their 
doors open. Therefore, an association technically should not be able to deny a person 
membership unless this has been specified in the constitution. Thus while there might be 
customs in their niches that indicate “normal” conditions for entrance, NPAs should 
regulate this in their constitutions. Secondly, an NPA cannot deny members the right to 
leave an association; nor can it set down rules which, in practice, would hinder their 
leaving. A constitutional clause that blocks a member’s right to leave or another clause 
that establishes hindrances in the form of abnormally high fees, as was the consequence 
of NJA 1987 s 438 or of procedures as in NJA 1982 s 438 and NJA 1987 s 438, can be 
rendered void in accordance with AvtL section 36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 NJA 1982 s 853; see also NJA 1958 s 654 and 1946 s 83. 
80 NJA 1982 s 853. 
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3. What does it take for an NPA to 
become a legal entity? 
3.1 Introduction 
Upon its becoming a legal entity, an NPA’s constitution has to fulfill some requirements 
which, according to Smiciklas, share some of the economic association’s characteristics.81 
Some of these requirements seem to affect the possibility an NPA has to organize itself 
and influence the decision-making process while others might affect the actual decision. 
This chapter aims to investigate  mandatory requirements from a holistic perspective. 
Mandatory requirements are partly or fully visible in at least three possible encounters 
through which an NPA’s status as a legal entity is evaluated: firstly, when an NPA 
chooses to register at Skatteverket in order to acquire a corporate identity number. 
Secondly, upon acceptance as a claimant or respondent in a court case, and thirdly, if the 
NPA is a religious society and it would like to register under the Act on Religious 
Communities (1998:1593).82  
3.2 Legal entity a requirement for getting a corporate 
ID number 
Since 1975, it has been possible for an NPA to apply for and receive a corporate identity 
number from Skatteverket in accordance the Identity Designation (Legal Persons) Act 
(1974:174) section 1:4 (religious societies) or section 2 (other nonprofit associations) 
respective section  5. Since an NPA must be a legal entity in order to receive a corporate 
identification number, Skatteverket lists on its homepage some mandatory requirements 
that must be fulfilled. Firstly, the NPA must have been established by at least three 
persons; secondly, it must have adopted a constitution of certain completeness which 
must include the association’s name and aim and must define how decisions are made 
within the constitution; and thirdly, the NPA must have selected a board.83 
 
Since 2004, NPAs have been able to avail themselves of court expertise in order to appeal 
Skatteverket’s refusal to issue corporate identity numbers and thus, in court, to have the 
question of their own status as a legal entity tried.  
                                                 
81 Smiciklas, page 170. 
82 Being a legal entity seems also to be one of the requirements in order for an NPA to participate in an 
environmental dispute in accordance with the Swedish Environmental Code (1998:808), 16:13. An NPA must 
also be a legal entity in order to register at the Swedish Companies Registration offices trade register. 
83 Skatteverket, SKV 371, no. 11, 2012, chapter 6:2 (web). 
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This occurs first at the Administrative Court and then possibly also in the Administrative 
Court of Appeal and perhaps also, lastly, in the Supreme Administrative Court.84  
 
There appear to be no cases yet in the Supreme Administrative Court and only a few 
cases from the Administrative Court of Appeal. I would therefore like to address one by 
one the requirements discussed by the courts in regard to the evaluation of an NPA as a 
legal entity. The approach of the Administrative Court of Appeal is interesting, because 
in practice, it is the highest authority in the majority of cases, since only a small 
percentage of cases reach this court.85  
A case reaches the Administrative Court of Appeal when the decision of the court is 
needed in order to establish a precedent, that is, to provide guidance on how similar cases 
should be assessed in the future.86 
3.2.1 Constitution of certain completeness: Detailed and specified 
aim 
In KamR 4128-07, the Administrative Court verified that an NPA becomes a legal entity 
as soon as it is established, and in order for an NPA to have been established, among 
other things,87 it must have adopted a constitution of certain completeness.  
In this case, the Svensk-Finska Kulturföreningen was denied a corporate identification 
number, since Skatteverket did not perceive them to have a precise and detailed aim.  
The Aim of Svensk-Finska Kulturföreningen was to promote Swedish-Finnish culture. 
The Administrative Court, supported by the Administrative Court of Appeal, had 
emphasized that one of the most important functions of the constitution should be to 
provide detailed and specified information about the NPA’s aim. A detailed and specified 
aim is needed in order to enable the board, members, and third parties to relate to the 
NPA. The court made clear that a detailed and specified aim is a requirement for a 
constitution of certain completeness. The Administrative Court emphasized the 
importance of the constitution both for the practical work within the association but also 
in that the constitution’s definition of its purpose defines the NPA’s character and 
motivates its existence and activity.88 
The question of detailed and specified aim came up for discussion again in KamR 
1905:09, in a dispute between the Swedish Skatteverket and a Christian organization by 
the name of Mon Ami, which wanted to register at the taxation office in order to acquire 
an organization number.  
 
                                                 
84 See the Law (2003:548) of amendments to the Identity Designation (Legal Persons) Act (1974:174), ref 
prop. 2002/03:99, page 275. 
85 Domstol.se/Supreme Administrative Court. 
86 Domstol.se/kammarrätten i Stockholm. 
87 See below. 
88 KamR 4128-07. 
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Skatteverket did not recognize Mon Ami as an NPA but questioned whether Mon Ami 
fulfilled the mandatory requirements for an NPA to be established, since Mon Ami did 
not have a specified aim.89 Skatteverket was turned down in the Administrative Court, but 
the Administrative Court of Appeal made it clear that in order for an NPA to be 
established, it must have a clear enough aim. The aim of Mon Ami, which was to spread 
the Christian message and knowledge of God’s creation to our health in accordance with 
Genesis 1:29, was not perceived to be a specific and detailed aim.90 
3.2.2 Constitution of certain completeness: The structure of 
decision making 
In KamR 3690-12, Direktdemokratisk samling’s (DS) application for a corporate 
identification number was turned down by Skatteverket, who did not perceive DS to be 
an NPA, since they did not have a hierarchical organization.  
 
In DS appeal to the Administrative Court, they claimed that even if they did not have a 
board, they had a named mail recipient, enabling a third party to bring action forward 
against DS. In this case, the claimant, DS, felt that the question of main importance must 
be that there exist visible regulations in regard to how decisions are made, and that when 
DS chose not to have a permanent leadership but instead published on their webpage 
which persons would represent DS with respect to which particular questions, this should 
be enough.  
 
The Administrative Court concluded that DS had adopted a constitution which, in 
addition to revealing their name and aim, made clear how decisions were made. That is, 
DS had an online meeting place named Kanalen, members of DS could meet online every 
Wednesday at 7:00 p.m., a keeper of the minutes was selected for each online meeting, 
resolutions were made through majority decisions, and lastly, every member had one vote 
each.91 The Administrative Court of Appeal also seem to include time and place of the 
general assembly meeting in the decision-making process. However, the Administrative 
Court of Appeal did not address this issue further in this case but focused on DS decision 
making structure.  
3.2.2.1 Hierarchical organization, board, general assembly and the annual 
general meeting 
In 2012 the question of a board was addressed quite fully by the Administrative Court of 
Appeal.92 In the case addressed above, DS claimed that the demand for an NPA to have a 
board in order to be a legal entity was supported neither by case law nor clear doctrine.93  
                                                 
89 KamR 1905-09. 
90 In KamR 1905-09 It is worth noting that in the taxation office’s claim, they stated that the religious society 
should show that it had practically pursued its aim, that the decisions made by the general assembly were in 
accordance with the aim, and that there were members who worked to pursue the aim. Ref. KamR 4128-07.  
91 KamR 3690-12. 
92
 Ibid 
93
 One might get the feeling that the claim put forward by DS closely resembles that of Augustsson, Oskar Z 
comments; see page 29 in his work, ref. note 51. 
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According to the Administrative Court, doctrine states that in order for an NPA to be a 
legal entity, it must have selected a board. However, according to case law, this is not an 
absolute necessity.94 The Administrative Court then went on to evaluate the particular 
nature of a board, finding that since a board can consist of only one person, there should 
be no problem in substituting the board with a deputy, as long as the function of the 
deputy will be the same as the function of the board.95 When evaluating whether the 
deputy in question has the same function of a board, the characteristic of crucial 
importance is that there is someone who can always represent the NPA in relation to the 
court, government, and other third parties. Thus the Administrative Court concluded that 
a nonprofit association can be a legal entity, even without a board, as long as someone is 
responsible on behalf of the association for a contractual relationship. Thus, the court 
supported DS claim.96  
 
Skatteverket appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, emphasizing that a formal 
board was not the same as the flexible organization of DS’s distribution of responsibility 
among different actors through the Internet. A board has a holistic responsibility covering 
a larger area, but with DS, a third party would not know what was included in a given 
responsibility, in particular since DS did not have someone who in all situations could 
take responsibility for all issues affecting the association. DS made clear that for each 
question that arose, they would appoint a member who was responsible. The responsible 
member would themselves have to make sure that their dealings were within the 
authorization given, which was also published on DS’s homepage.  
 
The Administrative Court of Appeal stated that through custom and court decisions, a 
general established practice has emerged.97 Based upon this, the court concluded that in 
order for an NPA to have been established, the NPA must have selected a board or a 
similar management body but also that NPAs’ different management bodies must be in a 
hierarchic relationship to each other. That is, the board is responsible to the general 
assembly, being the highest ranking governing body of the NPA at the annual general 
meeting.  
 
In this case, the Administrative Court of Appeal found that DS had no annual general 
meeting. DS had no board and that its constitution, furthermore, did not allow the 
appointment of a board. The Administrative Court of Appeal stated that the constitution 
of DS gave the members right to on a weekly meeting dissolve the organization. Thus, 
DS had no reasonable solid organization. The lack of a board, annual general meeting and 
the unclear and incomplete representations toward third parties, as well as potential 
questions in regard to taxes and fees in case of dealings in conflict with the taxation rules, 
meant that DS did not fulfill the basic requirements for becoming a legal entity.98  
 
                                                 
94
 KamR 3690-12 
95
 Ibid 
96
 Ibid 
97
 Ibid 
98 KamR 3960-12. The Administrative Court of Appeal in its reasoning rests heavily on doctrine and Supreme 
Courts praxis e.g NJA 1987 s 394 and NJA 1973 s 341. 
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The question of a board was slightly addressed in KamR, 4128-07, where the 
Administrative Court made clear that an NPA must have selected a board that can 
represent the association toward third parties, and in KamR 1905:09, where the 
Administrative Court of Appeal mentioned the appointment of a board among the 
mandatory requirements in order for an NPA to have been established.99  
3.2.3 A constitution of certain completeness 
According to the Administrative Court in KamR 4128-07, NPAs’ constitutions should 
include rules for functions that are normal for NPAs to have in common, namely, 
controlling functions (accounting), determining functions (general assembly meetings), 
and executive functions (the board). This case also found that rules regulating 
membership and termination of the same are important to an NPA’s constitution.100 This 
principle—the need of regulating functions together with the notion of a constitution of 
certain completeness—is also found at the Skatteverkets.se homepage. In addition to 
name and purpose, a constitution of certain completeness should include information 
about the NPA’s situation (where the board is situated), rules regarding membership and 
termination of membership, information regarding membership fees or rules regulating 
this, information regarding the accounting year, information and rules regarding the 
governing body, that is, general assembly meetings or extraordinary general assembly 
meetings, rules regulating notification of a general assembly meeting and rules governing 
the right for members to vote, information regarding how the board is selected, the 
board’s responsibility and number of board members and substitutes to the same, 
information regarding the selection of accountants and changes in the constitution, and 
lastly, rules regulating the dissolution of the NPA, with information regarding the 
allocation of assets upon dissolution.101 It is important to note that Skatteverket’s 
definition of what is included in a constitution of certain completeness does not define 
whether one is a legal entity or not but is more to be seen as a recommendation from a 
governmental agency that is not an entity that establishes law in this matter.  
However, while it appears to be true that a corporate identification number indicate that 
one is dealing with a legal entity, according to Lindquist, this might not always be the 
case.102 For example, within sports organizations, it has happened that sections of a larger 
sports organization have received corporate identification numbers without being NPAs 
in their own right.103 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 KamR 4128-07 and KamR 1905:09. 
100 KamR 4128-07. 
101
 Skatteverket, SKV 371, chapter 6:3, web. 
102
 Lindquist, Björn, Om gränsdragning inom idrottsföreningar, SvJT 1997, pages 839–840; see also Pallin, 
Christer, Den ideella förening och andra verksamhetsformer, Faktahäfte nr. 1. RF, Juridik 1994, page 23. See 
also KamR 2754-02, where the Administrative Court of Appeal did not perceive a group of cooperating 
NPAs which did not have a constitution as one legal entity, even if this group had received a corporate 
identification number. 
103 Ibid 
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Thus said, while it might not be enough for an NPA to be recognized as a corporate entity 
by Skatteverket in order to become a legal entity, it seems less likely that an NPA being 
denied this recognition can be perceived to be a legal entity. The lack of recognition by 
the Administrative Court of Appeal should therefore be a strong indicator in regard to 
whether the NPA in question can be a legal entity. The mandatory requirements put 
forward from the court could then be perceived as minimum requirements. 
3.3 Legal entity a requirement in court 
According to the legal literature, in order for an NPA to become a legal entity, it has to 
consist of members or legal entities who have made an agreement for a certain period or 
until further notice, and who pursue a mutual aim within and through the association, 
have formalized their agreement in a similar form to the articles of incorporation, and 
have adopted a constitution of certain completeness. 104  
 
In such constitutions, one finds the NPA’s name, aim, and headquarters address, a 
description of how decisions are made, and hierarchical authority structure that has been 
established between the different organs so that the organs on the lower levels are 
required to follow the instructions given by the organs situated higher up in the decision-
making process.105 For guidance on some of the fundamental principles of hierarchical 
authority structure, Johansson, in his book addressing the shareholders’ general assembly 
meeting, advises that the board being subordinated to the general assembly. 106 This also 
seems to apply for NPAs. 107  In principle, the general assembly is omnipotent in its 
authority to decide; however, it is also the case that a general assembly cannot intervene 
in the board's authority to such an extent that the board cannot function as responsible for 
the managing administration of the company.108 The general assembly may delegate the 
power of authority to decide to the board, but it does not authorize the board to take 
decisions that belong to the general assembly’s exclusive competence unless something 
else has been stated in law.109 As an implication of a hierarchical authority structure, it 
becomes visible who represents the association. The constitution is an NPA’s sign of 
identification and should clearly identify the NPA.110 
 
The members must have selected a responsible board or equivalent governing body to 
represent the NPA and to be responsible to the general assembly, and they must have 
adopted rules governing the board and the general meeting.111  
 
Regulations in regard to accounting (such as the accounting year and so on), how the 
constitution is to be amended, and so on, should also be included in the constitution.112    
                                                 
104 Mallmén, page 56; Rodhe, page 18; Hemström 2011, page 22; Hemström, Carl, Om vertikala 
organisationsstrukturer I Festskrift till Henrik Hessler 1985, page 259; Hemström 1972, page 5, ref. NJA 
1973 s 341 and NJA 1987 s. 394. 
105 Johansson 2011, page 38 and 68; Mallmén, page 56; Hemström 1985, page 256; Hemström 2011, pages 
22–23; ref. NJA 1973 s 341, NJA 1987 s. 394 and Lindquist, page 836. 
106
 Johansson, Svante, Bolagstämma 1990, page 81, 149 and 152. 
107
 Hemström 2011, page 23, 48 and 54. 
108
 Johansson, Svante, Bolagstämma 1990, page 81, 149 and 152 and Hemström 2011, page 23, 48 and 54. 
109
 Johansson 1990, page 152; Hemström 2011, page 54. 
110  Lindquist, page 836; Hemström 1985, page 270. 
111 Hemström 2011, page 23; Nerep 2007, page 25-27. 
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The necessity of a board has been questioned by Nerep, who perceives that the question 
of a board should be settled with consideration to the given NPA’s scope of activity, 
while Johansson, Lindquist, Hemström, Mallmén, and Melin all perceive a board to be a 
necessity.113 Hemström emphasizes the need of a board to represent the association 
toward third parties but also indicates that such a board can consist of only one member, 
if agreed in the constitution.114  
It is important to note that the board or substitution for a board must function as a board 
in an NPA; that is, it must perform identical tasks and have the same responsibility, since 
it appears to be the tasks performed that determine who and what constitutes a board in an 
NPA.115 The need of a board is due to the NPA becoming a legal entity.116 The board 
must promote the interests of the association.117 
Another requirement, put forward in the legal literature (addressed in 2.5), while not yet 
supported by case law, is the need for an NPA to be an open association that is, accepting 
of new members, unless something else has been agreed to in the NPA’s constitution. 
According to Lindquist, this also implies that an NPA cannot consist only of the persons 
who established it.118 
Hemström also states that from time to time, there has been a discussion in legal literature 
regarding the question of the necessity for an NPA to have its own capital in order to be a 
legal entity. However, the question may perhaps be if its economy is separated from its 
members. How, if, and to what extent this applies appears not to be certain.119 
The question of requirements that should be fulfilled in order for NPAs to become legal 
entities has been addressed by the Supreme Court a number of times through the years.  
3.3.1 Hierarchical organization, constitution and board 
In NJA 1913 s 393, a case involving a national masonic lodge with a hierarchical 
organization consisting of a national lodge, district lodges, and local lodges, the court 
emphasized the need of a constitution of a given nature and completeness in order for an 
NPA to be perceived as a legal entity.  
A question in this case was whether a local lodge that did not have its own constitution 
(while the national and the district lodge had their own constitution) but seemed to have a 
board could be a legal entity.120  
                                                                                                                                     
112 Johansson 2011, pages 38, 68 and 75; Mallmén, page 56; ref. NJA 1973 s 341 and NJA 1987 s. 394. 
113 Johansson 2011, pages 68; Lindquist, pages 836–7; Mallmén, page 56; Melin, 2010, page 119; ref. 
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taxation in accordance with the Swedish Income Tax Act 7:13, ref. prop 1976/77:135 page 78 and RÅ 2007 
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In NJA 1935 s 106, the association claimed, and was perceived as such by the court, that 
it had the status of an NPA and was a legal entity, since, in accordance with established 
legal understanding, it had adopted a constitution and installed a board. 121 
In AD 1972:1, the Swedish Labor Court dealt with the question of whether an NPA was a 
legal entity in a dispute over whether a section of a labor market organization could be 
part of a collective agreement or not.  
In this case, the Labor Court found that the local section was a legal entity and could 
stand court trial and could also be seen as being party to a collective agreement, despite 
the fact that the local section did not have its own constitution but could be seen as a 
branch of the national labor market organization’s departments (which, in themselves, 
were regulated through add-ons in the national labor market organization’s constitution). 
However, the members of the local section were entitled to select their own board. But 
this board was dissolved at the time of the dispute.122  
In 1973 s 341, a trade association stated that it could not participate in a court trial, since 
it was not yet fully established, seeing that even if the association in question had selected 
a chairman and a board, it had not yet adopted a constitution. In this case, three different 
NPAs were merged into a new NPA, Mellersta Norrlands Köpmannaförbund (MNK). 
Two of the NPAs were dissolved. The court secretary said that even if MNK had not yet 
adopted its own constitution, it functioned in accordance with the constitutions that the 
new trade association replaced. MNK organized annual general assembly meetings, had a 
board, rented premises in its own name, and had both employees and its own bank 
account. Also in accordance with certain older legal praxis, an NPA with a fairly firm 
organization became a legal entity. In order to have a fairly firm organization, an NPA 
must have adopted a constitution that reveals how decisions are made within the NPA and 
must have selected a board. Even if MNK, in this case, had not formally adopted a 
constitution, in praxis it was following a constitution. Even if MNK was not recognized 
as a legal entity in this case, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for a person who is 
in conflict with the association in its activities to have the possibility of having his or her 
dispute tried by the court.123  
In NJA 1987 s 394, the Supreme Court referenced established legal praxis that an NPA 
also must have adopted a constitution of certain completeness in order to become a legal 
entity. In a constitution of certain completeness, one finds the NPA’s name and purpose 
as well as information regarding how decisions about the NPA’s affairs are made.124 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Worth noticing is that the court refers to the Supreme Administrative Court decisions in RÅ 1920 s 215 
and RÅ 1929 s 40. 
122 AD 1972:1. 
123 NJA 1973 s 341 ref. NJA 2013 s 223 below 
124 NJA 1987 s 394  
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In NJA 2013 s 223, an NPA, temporarily without a board or an equivalent governing 
body, had leased an area for allotment gardening from the Swedish traffic board. The 
Swedish traffic board wanted to end the lease and made a public announcement in order 
to notify the NPA. The questions in the dispute were whether the NPA was a legal entity 
and whether it had been properly notified. What is interesting in this case is the thoughts 
of the Supreme Court, since while it is true that an NPA must have a selected 
representative in the form of a board or something similar in order to become a legal 
entity, it is also true that a third party, here the Swedish traffic board, can file a complaint 
against an NPA that does not have a board and is accordingly not a legal entity. The 
Supreme Court decided that an NPA without a board or a similar representative body can 
be a respondent in a court case, but it cannot appeal the judgment, unless a board is 
selected shortly thereafter. The notion here introduced by The Supreme Court is that of a 
non-complete legal entity. 125 
3.4 Religious societies 
Today, the Act on Religious Communities regulates the registration, rights, and 
obligations of religious communities. Here one finds that in order to be registered, 
according to section 7, the community must have a constitution and a governing board or 
equivalent body. 126 The religious society furthermore needs to have a stable organization 
in accordance with requirements put forward in NPA case law, and in this one finds a 
constitution of certain completeness, a constitution that specifies the religious 
community’s purpose and how decisions concerning its affairs are made.127 In section 9, 
one finds that when a religious community has been registered, it may acquire rights and 
assume obligations and be party to legal actions before courts or other authorities. Today 
one finds that guidance on liability issues for elected officers in registered faith 
communities may be derived from what is seen as custom and precedent for NPAs.128 
Which is in line with the legislator which indicated that religious communities should not 
have a special legal position in other respects than the basic requirements for registration 
as a religious community, including its dissolution and so on and that the internal 
relationship with members will still be categorized under the legal framework of 
associations. 129 
 
For NPAs registering under the Act on Religious Communities, one can question whether 
an NPA finally becomes a legal entity seeing that or if it is necessary to be a legal entity 
in order to register. It is a necessity to be a legal entity in order to register; it also seems 
that is necessary to remain a legal entity in order to continue being registered, since the 
law regulates legal entities.130 
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126 Prop. 1997/98:116, pages 24–25. 
127 Ibid, page 25. 
128 Församlingsjuridik 2012, page 48; Liability then sorts under the legal framework of associations.  
129 I Prop. 1997/98:116, page 18 and 120, Prop. 2009/10:55, page 12 see also Skog, Rolf, Rodhe, Knut, 
Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt 2011, page 20. 
130
 Prop. 1997/98:116, pages 32–33. 
 34. 
3.5 Summary - the structure and whereabouts of 
decision-making  
Due to a lack of space, I aim to focus on “must” requirements in this section and will 
therefore leave out those “should” requirements that are not indirectly included. What is 
left, then, is a set of minimum requirements, depending on the nature of the NPA in 
question. There might be a need for more details, some of which, such as the need to 
regulate who can become a member, will be discussed in 2.5. 
3.5.1 The particularities of a hierarchical authority structure 
Within legal literature and in the Administrative Court of Appeals case law (see sections 
3.3 and 3.2.2.1 above), one finds that in order for an NPA to become a legal entity it must 
have a hierarchical authority structure. In a hierarchical authority structure the organs on 
the lower levels are required to follow the instructions of organs situated higher up in the 
decision making process.  
This chapter aim to look into which organs are needed in order for an NPA to have a 
hierarchical authority structure.  
3.5.1.1 Is a board requirement for legal entities? 
Within the legal literature, one can ask whether or not the question of the necessity of a 
board has been settled. 
Being aware of Augustsson’s challenging essay, there still does not appear to me to be a 
real dispute or even a matter of disunity in the legal literature with respect to whether or 
not it is a requirement for an NPA to have a board. The reason for this is found in the 
wide scope of organizations identifying themselves as NPAs. However, while it seems 
clear that the question of a board should be settled with consideration of the given NPAs’ 
scope of activity, it is likewise clear that if an NPA is also to become a legal entity, an 
NPA must have either a board or a similar organ that has the same functionality, that is, 
that has the same responsibilities and performs the same tasks as a board. The board or its 
substitute must be responsible for the affairs of the NPA and must promote the NPA’s 
interest. Thus said, according to the legal literature, this board or substitute can consist of 
only one person. This conclusion would also be in line with the legislator which makes 
clear that religious societies which because of their non-economic nature belong to the 
group of pure NPAs must have a board or a similar functioning organ in order to register 
as a religious society, and thus be confirmed as a legal entity.  
In case law (see section 3.3.1), one finds in AD 1972:1 that an NPA with a dissolved 
board and without its own constitution was considered a legal entity in a dispute over 
being part of a collective agreement, and in NJA 2013 s 223, one further finds that 
another NPA, temporarily without a board, could be a respondent in a court case. In NJA 
2013 s 223, the Supreme Court made clear that while the NPA could be a respondent in 
the case, it could not appeal the judgment unless a board was selected in time. How, then, 
can the legal literature seem so clear while case law indicates something else?  
The explanation might be found in the circumstances of the cases.  
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The labor market organization and the NPA in NJA 2013 s 223 had existed for a time, so 
it is not unreasonable to believe that they had their own capital and a stable organization, 
and that even if they temporarily did not have a board, they normally would have had a 
board. One might say, then, that both organizations had certain autonomy and that the 
lack of compliance with the requirements for being a legal entity was only of a temporary 
nature and was therefore not in accordance with what was normal. Thus one could say 
that if an NPA has a stable organization, it appears, at least to a certain degree, to remain 
a legal entity even if it is temporarily without a board. It seems likely that a concern for 
third parties’ interest would influence the timeframe during which an NPA can remain in 
a temporary condition without a board. 
Such an explanation could also be in line with the Administrative Court of Appeals 
judgment in KamR 3690-12, which made clear that it is a necessity for an NPA to be able 
to have a board in order to be a solid organization, and that, as a consequence of not 
having a board, an NPA will have an incomplete and unclear representation toward third 
parties as well as governmental agencies in regard to taxation and the like. Since 
Direktdemokratisk samling did not have a hierarchical organization and believed in 
flexible leadership, the splitting of leadership responsibility and its variation resulted in 
the consequence that the organization became more of a loosely knit group of interested 
people than a firm organization. 
3.5.1.2 Is a general assembly a requirement?   
One find that legal literature take for granted that an NPA has a general assembly, but this 
question do not seem to have been addressed scientifically by legal professionals, nor by 
students of law.  
 
In legal literature (see section 3.3), one finds that the board is subordinated to the general 
assembly. This accountability of the board to the general assembly is one of the essential 
features of the hierarchical authority structure. This is also visible in KamR 3690-12 
where one finds that the general assembly constitutes the highest ranking governing body 
of the NPA at the annual general meeting.  In the same case one finds that in order for an 
NPA to become a legal entity the NPA must have a general assembly, have selected a 
board and conduct annual general meetings. The reason legal literature perceives general 
assembly as obvious in an NPA might be that it is a mandatory feature of the organization 
form of associations in that members of associations are entitled to manage the 
association's affairs, authorize a board and so on. Thus, while the question of having a 
general assembly has not been an issue of dispute in court yet, it might look like that in 
order to become an association the NPA must have a general assembly. 
 
What is new in KamR 3960-12 is the mentioning of an annual general meeting as 
belonging to the basic requirements for becoming a legal entity. In this case, DS 
conducted general assembly meetings once per week. The members of the association 
were continuously involved in the association’s decision-making process so it was not a 
question of lack of influence in regard to the NPA’s internal affairs. In the case, we find 
that the Administrative Court of Appeals emphasizes the need of a board that can be held 
accountable toward members and represent the association toward third parties. 
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3.5.2 The constitution, a frame of the legal entity’s decisions 
3.5.2.1 Is a formal constitution necessary? 
In NJA 1913 s 393, the Supreme Court found that a local section of a masonic lodge 
without its own constitution but with a board was not a legal entity, while in AD 1972:1, 
the Swedish Labor market court found a labor market organization without its own 
constitution and with a dissolved board to be a legal entity. Also the Supreme Court in 
NJA 1987 s 384 emphasized the need of a constitution. 
 
AD 1972:1 and NJA 1973 s 341 share some common features. Firstly, both NPAs had 
existed for a while and had stable organizations. The labor market organization section 
followed the constitution of its parent organization, which might have regulated the 
particular section, thus giving third parties a way of identifying the particular section.  
It could also be that in case of a dispute, the parent section would cover for the local 
section. MNK, on the other hand, came into life by way of three trade organizations 
merging into a new NPA; the constitution it followed was the constitution of one of the 
NPA it replaced.  Thus, MNK constituted a new entity, still there was some continuity, 
seeing that MNK also had both employees and its own bank account. The lodge, on the 
other hand, also seems to have been regulated by its parent constitution, but since this 
was a bankruptcy case, one can but question whether the court at that time had a higher 
demand for security. It is also possible that there could have been a development to a 
more liberal perception of the constitution over time. However, as with the discussion 
regarding a board, it is my perception that the Supreme Court has a holistic perspective 
on what constitutes an NPA and that the court takes into consideration the particularity of 
the situation while emphasizing the need for the protection of both third parties and 
members. Still, in the legal literature and in NJA 1987 s 384, it is made clear that a 
constitution is a prerequisite for becoming a legal entity, and since the function of the 
constitution is to identify the particular NPA by stating its aim and describing how 
decisions are made within the organization, together with its name and headquarters 
address, it becomes difficult to understand how a constitution can exist only in a verbal 
form.  
 
Thus, while it is understandable that internal praxis can work as a filler of gaps when it 
comes to the constitution, it seems plausible that as a general rule, in order to ensure that 
an NPA is to be perceived as a legal entity, it must have a written constitution. Still, there 
could be exceptions. For example, if an association has been connected to a parent 
association for a given amount of time but starts to act more and more on its own, in that, 
for example, power is decentralized and its ability to make its own decisions increases, 
there could be a situation that resembles AD 1972:1. 
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3.5.2.2 What is a constitution of certain completeness? 
In the governmental bill predating the Act on Religious Communities, in a constitution of  
certain completeness, one also finds the purpose and how decisions concerning an NPA’s 
affairs are taken. In addition, in the legal literature one finds that when considering how 
decisions are made, one has to take into account the necessity of a hierarchical authority 
structure.  
The importance of the aim and objective for operations 
In KamR 4128-07, Svensk-Finska Kulturföreningen-Skatteverket, it was made clear that 
the aim must be precise and detailed enough to enable the association’s board, members, 
and third parties to relate to the NPA on both a practical level that motivates its activity 
and existence. The aim express the character of the NPA. This implies that an NPA’s aim 
is defining the NPA and the scope of its activities and must be clear and detailed enough 
to enable evaluation.  
How can decisions be made in an NPA?  
Given the necessity of having a hierarchal structure, with a general assembly and a board, 
since the board and leadership are responsible to the members and the lower organ is to 
follow the instructions of the higher organ, it follows that in order for an NPA to fulfill 
the requirement for legally correct decisions, the NPA constitution must include the 
following:  
 
Some NPAs, because of their size or type, have rules in their constitutions in regard to 
delegates. If the general assembly consists of delegates, the constitution must state what 
constitutes the general assembly, how the general assembly is selected, and who selects it. 
The right to participate and vote seems likely to influence the selection of these delegates 
since delegates represent and substitute for members at a general assembly meeting. As a 
consequence, in a hierarchical democratic institution, these delegates must be selected by 
the members and not by the board. Secondly, it must be clear in the constitution how the 
general assembly makes its decisions. This should necessitate rules in regard to process. 
In regard to changes of the constitution it seems plausible that these must be adopted by 
the general assembly in order to apply. Thirdly, it must be clear how the board is selected 
and that this should be done by the general assembly and how many should be on the 
board and for what lengths of time; information should also be provided in regard to 
substitutes. Fourthly, the constitution must include information about how decisions are 
made within the board and whether there are any limitations on or expansions of the 
board’s power. The right to participate and vote seems likely to influence also what 
happens after the meeting, since a member cannot exercise their right to participate as a 
member or delegate if they cannot bring forward proceedings against faulty resolutions 
after the meeting.  
 
 
 
 38. 
When addressing how decisions are made in KamR 3690-12 the Administrative Court 
seem to include when and where decisions are made (see section 3.2.2. above). The 
Administrative Court of Appeal also mentions time and place when addressing the 
decision-making process. Thus one might get the impression that the constitution must 
reveal when and where decisions are made. Due to the necessity of a board to be granted 
freedom from liability and enable third parties transparency and security it is likely the 
board should be granted freedom from liability in connection with adoption of the 
accounts therefore it seems likely that while NPAs might be able to have more meetings 
throughout the year NPAs must conduct some kind of annual general meeting. Also it 
seems likely that in order to protect vendors and third parties the constitution must 
include information in regard to how decisions about dissolutions will be made. Basically 
then the constitution should reveal when decisions are made, by whom will decisions be 
made and how will decisions be made. 
 
Chapter five will deal more with the whereabouts of faulty resolutions and proceedings. 
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4. General principles of law 
4.1 Introduction 
In addition to being regulated through the mandatory requirements concerning its 
constitution, whose legal status was also addressed above in 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, an NPA that 
is a legal entity might be regulated by the general principles of law existing within the 
legal framework of associations; some of them which adhere to the class of unwritten 
law.131 Legal framework that are unwritten need not be invisible, if the rules once existed 
in writing or still exist today within the particular framework of some given associations. 
It is possible in the legal literature addressing NPAs to identify at least four different but 
sometimes overlapping general principles of law perceived as applicable to NPAs.132 
Here one finds the principle of equal treatment, the general clauses, the majority rule and 
conflict of interest. 133  
4.2 The principle of equal treatment  
4.2.1 Content 
The principle of equal treatment provides that no member should be placed in a better or 
worse position than another member, but it does not require that an actual benefit for one 
member is combined with another member’s disadvantage.134  
 
The particular nature of the principle of equality has not been discussed much in the legal 
literature addressing NPAs, so it seems reasonable to look for guidelines, where such are 
lacking, in other parts of the legal framework of associations. 
 
One can argue that the equality principle is visible in the Company Act (ABL) 4:1, where 
it is written that “all shares shall carry equal rights in the company, unless otherwise 
provided in sections.” According to Nial, the principle’s purpose was to ensure that the 
position between shares that once was assured to the stockholder was maintained. 135  
 
                                                 
131 SOU 2010:90, page 323, ref. Truyver, Filip, Aksjonærernes myndighetsmisbruk – en studie av asl./asal. 
section 5–21 og uskrevne misbrukspinsipper 2005, pages 208–211. 
132 Hemström 2011, page 37, and 1977, page 30. 
133 Hemström 2011, pages 37–38 and 54; Johansson 2011, pages 156 and 163; Stattin, Daniel, 
Minoritetsskydd och klander, pages 90–91; Andersson, Jan och Pehrson, Lars, Likhetsprincipen och 
generalklausulerna, pages 110, 118 and 121, both in Aktiebolagens minoritetsskydd (Red. Svernlöv, Carl) 
2008. 
134 Hemström 2011, pages 37–38; Mallmén, page 304 ref. Andersson and Pehrson, page 139. 
135
 Nial 1934, pages 23 and 26. 
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Andersson and Pehrson argue that the present understanding of the equality principle has 
its base in the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13, 1976, article 42, 
which states that “For the purposes of the implementation of this Directive, the laws of 
the Member States shall ensure equal treatment to all shareholders who are in the same 
position.”136 And they argue that therefore, the Swedish equality principle should be 
translated and applied in accordance with article 42, meaning that all shareholders in the 
same situation have equal rights and should receive equal treatment.137 For corporations, 
the principle of equality seems to apply to all agreements or actions undertaken that affect 
the management of the company’s affairs.138 
4.2.2 Deviations  
For NPAs, it appears that all members should be entitled to equal treatment unless 
something else is stated in the law or the NPA constitution or occasionally if it can be 
objective justified as in the interest of the particular NPA.139If one adopts constitutional 
rules justifying the different treatment of members, all members should agree.140A 
constitutional clause aimed at limiting the principle of equal treatment can be rendered 
void if the conditions are right.141If an NPA would like to treat some members differently 
from others, it seems in line with the principle of equality that this must be objectively 
justified.142 When considering what would count as objective, justifiable reasons for 
companies, one might take into account the relative strength of the reasons provided, the 
number and frequency of the deviations, the time periods, and the actual member 
advantages or disadvantages in comparison to other members in the particular case.143 
The principle of equal treatment can also be set aside occasionally with the actual 
member who has been treated unequal’s consent.144  
 
Johansson state that in order to deviate from the principle of equal treatment the decision 
made must not be unreasonable, and outside the conditions for the actual members’ 
admission.145 When addressing corporations, Johansson states that it should not be 
possible to deviate from the principle of equal treatment in regard to such rights that, 
according to the law, are directly related to the membership.146  
                                                 
136 Andersson and Pehrson, page 117. 
137 Ibid, pages 118–119, ref 125. 
138
 Ibid, page 130. 
139 Hemström 2011, page 38 ref. Prop. 1973:93 s 137; This is based upon the considerations put forward in 
the legal literature about its application in ABL; see also Rodhe and Nial’s critique of the concepts business 
economic correct and in the company’s interest in Skog, Rolf, Rodhe, Knut, Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt, 2002, 
page 244 and 248 samt Nial, Håkan and Johansson, Svante, Svensk associationsrätt i hovuddrag 1991. 
Compare with Andersson and Pehrson, pages 133–137; see also Johansson 2011, page 158.  
140 Hemström 2011, page 38, ref. SOU 1949:9; Andersson and Pehrson, page 120, SOU 2010:90, page 428. 
ref. NJA 1977 s 393 and Mallmén, page 310. It is not possible generally to say what objective reasons are; 
However there seem to exist fundamental principles which might guide. 
141 Hemström 2011, pages 38–39 and 47–48; Mallmén, page 310 ref. NJA 1977 s 393. 
142 Hemström 2011, page 38, ref. SOU 1949:9; Andersson and Pehrson, page 120, SOU 2010:90, page 428. 
ref. NJA 1977 s 393 and Mallmén, page 310. It is not possible generally to say what objective reasons are; 
However there seem to exist fundamental principles which might guide. 
143 Andersson and Pehrson, page 138. 
144
 Hemström 2011, page 38 
145
 Johansson 2011, page 162-163. 
146
 Ibid, page 161. 
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Among these, the right that can be applicable to democratic NPAs is the right to 
participate and vote at a general assembly meeting.147  
 
Andersson and Pehrson feel that limited companies should have more reasons for 
deviations from the principle of equality than other associations, such as economic 
associations, since a limited company is a capitalist association, which is more weakly 
rooted in the democratic ideal than a number of other associations.148 
 
A conflict with the principle of equal treatment can only exist when unequal treatment 
has been established.149 Therefore, a claimant normally must show that as a consequence 
of a decision that discriminates between members, a real advantage or disadvantage for 
members exists, while the defendant must prove that objective reasons for unequal 
treatment exist.150  
 
There seem to exist a few Supreme Court cases in more recent times where deviations 
from the principle of equal treatment have been addressed. However, no NPAs have been 
involved in any of these. 
 
In NJA 1977 s 393, Gertrud A, after expulsion from the cooperative housing association 
for not having paid membership fees, claimed that it was against the principle of equal 
treatment to expel her. Seeing that the rest of the members (here between 5 and 10) who 
had not paid the same fees was not expulsed. The economic association gave three 
reasons for the expulsion: firstly, Gertrud’s provoking behavior, in that she had made 
clear that she intended not to pay until the matter had been settled in court; secondly, that 
they would expel the other members after the court had dismissed Gertrud’s case; and 
lastly, that Gertrud had moved out of her apartment. The Supreme Court made clear that 
there need to exist objective reasons for unequal treatment of members and that the 
reasons put forward in this case were not deemed objectively justified.151 
 
In NJA 1989 s 751, there was a question of a possible violation of both the equality 
principle and the general clause; in this case, a member disputed the cooperative housing 
association’s right to allocate a cable television fee depending on the size of the 
apartment. The court stated that main aim of the principle of equality was to target clearly 
unfair or otherwise improper cases of favoritism or discrimination against certain 
members. The court found that neither the principle of equality nor the general clause had 
been violated in this case; the Supreme Court established this judgment.152  
 
 
 
                                                 
147 Ibid, page 162. 
148 Ibid, pages 137–138; see also Mallmén, page 308 with ref. for a discussion of the general clause’s more 
extensive application to economic associations. 
149 Andersson and Pehrson, page 140. 
150 Ibid; ref. Mallmén, page 309. 
151 NJA 1977 s 393, summary of conlusions in NJA 1999 s 171. 
152 NJA 1989 s 751, summary of conlusions in NJA 1999 s 171. 
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The issue of objective reasons for deviating from the principle of equality was up for 
discussion in NJA 2009 s 550, a dispute by a member of a cooperative housing 
association who was denied the right to build a balcony while others in the same 
apartment house were granted such right. Reasons put forward by the association for 
denying this right were architectural and aesthetic but also economic in the form of 
possibly decreasing value. In this case, the Court of Appeal made clear that a court can 
only try general assembly decisions made in due order if the resolutions conflict with the 
constitution, law, or legal praxis applicable to associations. In this case, it was not a 
question of conflict with the law or the constitution, but with the legal framework of 
associations’ well-established principle of equal treatment. The Court of Appeal further 
stated that if the association could put forward objective reasons of some weight that 
could justify a deviation from the principle of equality, it would permissible for an 
association to set aside the principle. 
 
There was nothing in the examination of the case that indicated that the decision was 
aimed at discriminating between members and that therefore was unfair or illegal. The 
reasons put forward by the cooperative housing association were supported both by an 
architect, who emphasized the esthetical and architectural reasons, and also the office for 
building permits, who put forward reasons for not building the balcony (oddly enough, a 
building permit was still granted). Lastly, there existed rules put forward by the 
municipality that supported the cooperative housing association’s decision.  
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the objective reasons put forward in this case by the 
housing association were sufficient for putting aside the principle of equality.153 Worth 
noticing is that in his analysis of this case, Munukki stated that an objective justification 
need not be the most eligible solution.154  
 
In NJA 2012 n 13, a dispute over the need of noise barriers and the distribution of the 
cost of building them involved another cooperative building association case. The court 
made clear that it cannot be required that all members should benefit alike from all 
decisions; it is more or less inevitable that some decisions in reality bring greater benefits 
for some members than others do. This cannot constitute a violation of law, at least not 
when it is question of a necessary or reasonable utility. The court in this case concluded 
that while some members in the housing association benefitted more than other members 
from the decision to build a noise barrier, the decision was not in itself illegal. This 
conclusion was supported by the Supreme Court.155 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 NJA 2009 s 550. 
154 Monukki, Jori, Analys: Likhetsprincipen i BRF forfarande oklar trots nytt HD-avgörande. 
155 NJA 2012 n 13 
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4.2.3 Applicability on NPAs  
In chapter 2.4 one find, that one of the essential features of the organization form of 
associations is that members of associations are entitled to manage the association’s 
affairs. Chapter 3.5.1.2 made clear that members of associations are entitled to manage 
the association’s affairs through participation in general assembly meetings. The question 
that then arises is whether all members enjoy the same right to participate in the 
management of the association’s affairs at the general assembly meeting. 
Both the legislator, case law and in legal literature one finds that the principle of equal 
treatment belongs to the group of general principles of law applicable on all 
associations.156 In the preparatory work predating the Act on Religious Communities one 
find that the general principles of law works as fillers of the gaps in NPAs and applies 
when nothing else has been specified in law or the constitution.157 The applicability of 
general principles of law on NPAs is also visible in case law, se for example NJA 1987 s 
394 where one find that in the absence of law, general principles of law are applicable on 
NPAs. Also, NJA 2013 s 223, and NJA 2008 s 255 name general principles of law among 
the sources of law for NPAs.158 
In “A policy for the civil society”, one finds that the principle of equal treatment is 
considered to be one of the most important general principles of law.159 The reason to this 
perception might be that the principle of equal treatment is a fundamental feature of 
democracy and the understanding that the Swedish democracy was born out the equal 
treatment practices pre-existing within non-profit associations. 160  
In the middle of the 19th century, a democratic meeting process had been developed 
within Sweden’s Free Church movements and the temperance movement which 
eventually was adopted by labor organizations. This democratic decision-making process 
spread to the governmental sector mainly since many political active actors came from 
the non-profit sector and worked to implement political democracy but also through 
cooperation with non-profit associations.161 Thus, one can say that it seems like the 
Swedish democracy originated in NPAs.   
Today the principle of equal treatment is visible in RF 1:9 and secure that all people are 
equal before the law. This principle is also perceived to be an objectivity principle when 
it comes to governmental decision making in that governmental agencies and -companies 
are to show no favoritism but treat all people equal in their decision-making process.162  
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Nerep states that the principle of equal treatment apply in NPAs unless the members 
unanimous has agreed to something else. Hemström emphasizes that it is beyond doubt 
that the principle of equal treatment is applicable on NPAs general assembly meetings 
while Johansson state that the principle of equal treatment is applicable but the principle 
of equal treatment’s implications are not fully known.163 Chapter 4.2.4.2 aim to address 
the implication of the principle of equal treatment on an NPA general assembly meeting.  
4.2.4 Concluding remarks 
4.2.4.1 Is the principle of equal treatment applicable on an NPA’s general 
assembly meeting? 
In “A policy for the civil society”, one finds that internal praxis based upon the principle 
of equal treatment in NPAs predate the principle’s implementation in the Swedish society 
as a part of democracy. Even today NPAs are perceived to be democratic organizations 
that are deeply rooted in the democratic ideal. Therefore, it seems difficult to understand 
if the principle of equal treatment should not be applicable on NPAs. 
 
The principle of equal treatment are considered to be one of the most important general 
principles of law and one find that governmental bills, case law and legal literature alike 
emphasize the applicability of general principles of law on NPAs. 
  
The principle of equal treatment when applicable would be applicable on decision-
making in NPA and according to Hemström this includes general assembly meetings. 
4.2.4.2 What implication does the principle of equal treatments have for a 
general assembly resolution? 
As a result of the principle of equality applicability on an NPA’s general assembly 
meeting, all members of NPAs must necessary enjoy the same right to participate in the 
management of the association’s affairs at the general assembly meeting. According to 
the principle of equal treatment, members in the same positions should be dealt with, in 
the same way, unless something else has been specified in the constitution, and the 
constitutional clause is reasonable and has been adopted in a correct way.  
 
Under the principle of equal treatment, all members enjoy the same right to participate in 
a general assembly meeting and to vote. In order to enjoy the same right to participate in 
a general assembly meeting and vote, a member must receive the same information as 
other members in regard to when the meeting will be. Therefore, a member must receive 
notification of the meeting in due time before the meeting; the principle further implies 
that a member should know the agenda beforehand. This would apply in particular to 
larger NPAs or to NPAs with longer general meetings.  
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 Nerep 2007, page 20, Hemström 2011, page 38, also see Johansson 2011, page 163 and 156. 
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The order of cases in the agenda should not be subject to change without the consent of 
all members or delegates present at the general assembly meeting, since members must 
know when a case will be dealt with at the meeting in order to make sure that they are 
present and can exercise their right to participate. 
 
In order for a member to participate in the meeting, the member must have access to the 
necessary documents needed to prepare himself or herself. Furthermore, members must 
be given the same possibility as other members to have their voices heard at the meeting. 
A member can also let their voice be heard if they issue a motion, and this motion has the 
same right as all other cases to be dealt with at the meeting. Thus, one cannot deny a 
member the right to have his or her motion dealt with at the general assembly meeting.  
However, it is likely that through the constitution and/or through information given to 
members beforehand, one can regulate how to deal with motions in a committee and what 
kinds of motions are adequate to issue to the general assembly. 
 
4.2.4.3 When is it possible to deviate from the principle of equal 
treatment? 
It seems that a deviation from the principle of equal treatment is not acceptable unless 
something else has been stated in law, constitution or occasionally if it can be objective 
justified. In order for something to be objectively justified it must also be in the interest 
of the NPA, and there must exist objectively justified reasons carrying some weight. 
Deviation can also occasionally happen  when the actual member who has been treated 
unequal consent. In order for a constitution to sanctify deviation from the principle of 
equal treatment in the constitution there are reasons to believe that this is only possible 
with the unanimous consent from all members. Thus, different treatment of members can 
be acceptable from time to time while unfair actions or decisions, improper favoritism or 
discriminations against certain members is prohibited. Also, it seems not possible to 
deviate from the principle of equal treatment when it comes to members’ right to 
participate and vote at a general assembly meeting. 
 
In NJA 1977 s 393, one could see that a member could not be dealt with differently than 
other members. However, with that said, objective reasons for dealing with members 
differently can exist, even if the reasons might not be the optimal solution, as in NJA 
1989 s 751, where the cable television fee correlated with the size of the apartment and in 
NJA 2009 s 550, where some had balconies while others did not. Members cannot always 
expect to benefit alike from all resolutions. 
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4.3 The general clauses 
4.3.1 Content 
The general clauses supplement the rules on a qualified majority for certain general 
assembly decisions, provide limitations to the general assembly’s freedom to make 
decisions, and aim to prevent operations that circumvent the equality principle. The 
general clauses can also to a certain extent overlap the principle of equal treatment.164  
The overlapping functionality is visible in the legal literature as well as in case law.165 
AvtL section 36 seems also to overlap the general clauses.166   
 
The general clause is visible in FL 7:16 (general assembly) and 6:13 (board). FL rules 
derivate from ABL’s general clauses in 7:47 (general assembly) and 8:41 (board) and 
state the following: “The general meeting may not adopt any resolution which is likely to 
provide an undue advantage to a member or another person to the disadvantage of the 
company or another member,” and “The board or deputy may not undertake an 
transaction or any actions which is likely to provide an undue advantage to a member or 
another person to the disadvantage of the company or another member.”167 While a 
decision or action marking a breach of the principle of equality must cause a real benefit 
or disadvantage, the general clause is applicable already when a decision is aimed at 
providing an undue advantage or disadvantage.168 
Again looking for guidance in corporate law, one finds that there can be three types of 
decisions aimed at providing undue advantage with the consequence of a disadvantage or 
vice versa. Firstly, one has decisions aimed at providing someone else with an advantage 
but which means a disadvantage for a company.169 Secondly, one finds decisions aimed at 
benefitting one or more members, to a disadvantage for the company, and thirdly, 
decisions that are aimed at providing an undue advantage for some members, to the 
disadvantage of other members.170  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 Andersson, Johansson and Skog, page 7:92, Andersson and Pehrson, page 128, Mallmén, pages 303–304. 
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Andersson and Pehrson emphasize that the general clauses’ main aim is to deal with 
decisions characterized by the abuse of power; thus, they are applicable both when a 
decision do not disrupt the legal relationship between shares, for example, when it is 
possible for a third party to acquire a privilege that otherwise should have been given to 
shareholders and where this privilege is an undue benefit, and in situations where it is 
legally correct to deviate from the principle of equality but where the resolution means an 
undue deviation while acknowledging that shareholders cannot always expect to benefit 
alike from all decisions.171  
 
The undue requisite is also to be found in AvtL; a reason for this might be that the 
Swedish general clause could be perceived as a development, or rather as a specification, 
of an old fundamental principle, perhaps even from German law, stating that legal acts 
that conflict with good praxis are invalid. Today this principle is visible in AvtL section 
33.172  
 
When addressing the undue requisite, Adlercreutz explains that one should take into 
consideration the agreement’s content, the context of its establishment, and whether 
something happened later on that changed the prerequisites or other circumstances. 173  
4.3.2 Deviations 
As with the equality principle, one can set aside the general clause through constitutional 
agreement; however, it also suggests that decisions aimed at setting aside general clauses 
can be faulted.174 Breaches of the principle of equality and the general clause may induce 
liability for damage.175 
A claimant must show that the decision is aimed at benefitting members or someone else 
at the expense of the company or of another member, or vice versa, and that the decision 
is unfair.176 The defendant, on the other hand, must show that there exist reasonable 
reasons for the action or decision undertaken.177 
 
While there does not seem to exist, at least in more recent times, case law addressing the 
implication of deviating from the general clauses for NPAs nor cases defining the 
particular important requirement of undue treatment, this has been addressed in a few 
cases involving other forms of associations.178  
                                                 
171 Pehrson, Lars, Generalklausuler i aktiebolagslagen, Festskrift till Sveriges 
Advokatsamfund 1887 – 1987, page 483ff; Andersson, Johansson and Skog, page 7:92.  
172
 Nial 1934, pages 40–43, ref. Adlercreutz, Axel, Avtalsrätt I 2002, pages 269–273. One can ask if section 
28, 30, and 36 in AvtL also have been influenced by this principle. 
173 RH 2010:71 ref. see also Nerep and Samuelsson’s discussion regarding what can be considered to be 
economically justifiable; compare with Skog and Rodhe 2011, pages 246–247 and Adlercreutz I, page 300. 
174 Andersson, Sten in a comment to FL 7:16 at Karnov and Hemström 2011, pages 38, 47–48. 
175 Johansson 2011, page 160, Applicabilty to NPAs probaly depends on the situation. 
176 Mallmén 2002, page 309 ref. Andersson and Pehrson, page 140 and Andersson, Johansson and Skog, page 
7:93. 
177 Andersson and Pehrson, page 141 ref. Mallmén, page 309. 
178 Andersson, Johansson and Skog, page 7:93, Also, according to Mallmén, the principle of equality and the 
general clause can in large part have the same meaning and implications for economic associations as they 
have for corporations. Mallmén, page 304 and 178 
 48. 
AD 1988 nr. 20 addressed a dispute about whether a golden parachute agreement between 
Jan Lunderg and Consilium Trading & Information AB (CTI) could be unfair according 
to ABL 8:13 (1975:1385), here benefitting Lundberg at the cost of the company. It was 
made clear that an agreement under which the previous managing director of a daughter 
company was left with two years’ payment, seemingly a normal procedure in this 
company at the same level of management, was not undue. This was the case even if the 
company, as such, was facing economic difficulties and went through a restructuring 
which, for the daughter company, meant the sale of shares and new owners.179 
The question of whether an action was unfair was up for discussion in NJA 2000 s 404, 
where a company’s property were transferred to the majority shareholders’ company by 
the board; the minority holder was thus left with shares of no value. In this case, the 
Court of Appeal stated that a company’s scope of purpose as defined in the company’s 
constitution is legally binding for the company’s different organs. The board’s decision 
was thus in conflict with both the company’s constitution and purpose.  
When questioning whether the decision was in conflict with the general clause in ABL 
8:13 (1975:1385), the Court of Appeal evaluated the reasons for the decision as put down 
by the defendant.  
Among else there existed no documentation confirming that the action was undertaken by 
necessity and the economic and administrative reasons put forward by the respondent 
were made with the aim of benefitting the company that took over the asset and not the 
company that was emptied. In this case the Supreme Court like the Court of Appeal found 
that the board’s decision was intended to damage the minority holder. The Supreme Court 
put words to this, stating that the decision must be seen as providing the majority holder 
an unfair benefit at the cost of the minority holder. The members of the board became 
personally liable to pay damage to the claimant.180 
In NJA 2013 s 117, a cooperative housing association filed a claim for damage against 
the previous board, questioning whether FL 6:13 was applicable to a decision supported, 
at the time, by all members of the association. According to the Supreme Court, the 
general clause is a protection against disloyal actions toward the association or its 
members and can as a general rule only be set aside with the consent of all the affected 
members at the time. A general rule can only be set aside if there exist sufficient reasons. 
A change in building plans of a garage, which was approved by the previous board and 
granted freedom from liability by all members in the association at the time, was not 
perceived to provide such sufficient reasons.181 
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4.3.3 Applicability on NPAs  
According to Nerep, the general clauses of ABL might be applicable on NPAs.182 
Hemström perceive the general clauses as included in the principle of equal treatment 
and, therefore, applicable on NPAs general assembly decisions. 183 The inclusion of the 
general clauses in the principle of equal treatment one also finds in Johansson, who states 
that the general clauses sometimes has been perceived as expressing the principle of equal 
treatment.184 Rohde/Skog also sees the general clauses together with other clauses as an 
expression of the principle of equality. Thus, in legal literature one can perceive a 
tendency to categorize both the general clauses and the principle of equality under the 
umbrella of the principle of equality.185  
The perception of the general clauses as an expression of the principle of equal treatment 
is confirmed by the legislator and also in case law.186  
4.3.4 Conclusive remarks 
4.3.4.1 Is the general clause applicable on an NPA’s general assembly 
meeting resolution? 
If the general clause were not applicable on an NPA general meeting, this would conflict 
with the notion that all members of NPA’s enjoy the same right to participate in the 
management of the association’s affairs at the general assembly meeting.  
In addition seeing a tendency in legal literature, and that both the legislator and case law 
perceive the general clauses to be an expression of the principle of equal treatment it 
seems reasonable to believe that the general clauses are applicable on an NPA general 
assembly resolution ( see 4.3.3 above).  
4.3.4.2 What implication does the general clauses have for a general 
assembly meeting 
The foremost function of the general clause on a general assembly meeting must be to 
secure materially correct resolutions. The implication of the general clause ensures that a 
general assembly cannot adopt resolutions that aim to provied someone else, or even a 
member, with an undue advantage to the cost of the NPA; nor can the general assembly 
issue resolutions aiming at providing an undue advantage for some members to the 
disadvantage of other members.  
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4.3.4.3 When is it possible to deviate from the general clause? 
Within the frame of the general assembly meeting it seems possible to set aside the 
general clause with the consent of all affected members at the given time. There must 
exist sufficient reasons for setting aside the principle. In order for the general clause to be 
set aside the resolution in question must not aim to enable an undue advantage to 
someone else’s disadvantage or directly to aim at providing an undue advantage to 
someone else’s disadvantage. 
 
What is to be considered undue depends on the situational context. In AD 1988 nr. 20,  
quite extensive golden parachute agreement was not to be considered undue, since golden 
parachute agreements were the praxis of the company; nor did it then matter, either, that 
the company was facing economic difficulties. While NJA 2000 s 404 made clear that the 
abuse of power must be intentional and that in order for the abuse of power to be 
intentional, the action should not have been based upon objective reasons. In order for 
objective reasons to exist the action must be necessary and not aiming at providing the 
majority with an unfair benefit at the cost of the minority or the NPA. This case also 
indicated that a resolution that aims to close down established operations as mentioned in 
2.4.3.1 and 4.3.2 also can be categorized under the general clause. With that said, one 
must bear in mind that to close down operations might not always have economic 
implications; the closing down must, of course, result in a disadvantage. How exactly this 
applies to an NPA without any economic goal is difficult to say, but if the decision will 
affect an NPA’s income, possible growth, and existence, then it should have some effect, 
at least for larger NPAs.  
NJA 2013 s 117 showed firstly that the general clause protects only existing members and 
not future members from abuse but also that even the right to set aside the general clause 
with the consent of all members can be revoked if there exist sufficient reasons for doing 
so. 
4.4 The majority rule 
4.4.1 Content 
In principle the majority rule provides that a simple majority applies when voting, unless 
the constitution prescribes more extensive conditions.187  
4.4.2 Deviations 
For NPAs, it seems to hold that, even if normal changes to the constitution require a 
qualified majority, that is, two-thirds of the votes at least for more serious changes, it is 
possible to make adjustments to the constitution even with a simple majority.188 Here 
again, it seems to imply that changes to the constitution of a serious nature, such as 
significant changes to an NPA’s objectives, should require consent from all members.189 
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Johansson states that decisions to discontinue activity, radical changes of objective, 
drastic increases to member fees, or the use of the association’s money for public or 
similar purposes that are not related to the association's goals should be invalid, that is, 
unless all members have consented to these decisions.190 Johansson advises that in some 
cases, the majority should proceed to establish a new NPA instead. The principle behind 
this seems to be that if a decision is so radical that it can be objectively perceived as 
undue, with consideration of the constitutional conditions that existed when the members 
started their membership, it should be invalid.191  
 
When addressing corporations, Johansson adds the relationship between stocks to other 
changes of a serious nature. He also states that in order for serious changes to be valid, 
they must have the consent of all members present at the general assembly meeting, and 
these members must represent at least 9/10 of all shares in the company.192 
There appears to exist just one case that addresses deviation from the majority rule, and 
again, this is not an NPA case. 
In NJA 2012 s 198, there was a dispute in regard to whether a simple or a qualified 
majority was needed in order to make a decision. In this case, the Supreme Court made 
clear that the association (the claimant, a cooperative housing association) should bear the 
burden of proof for justifying why a qualified majority was needed.  
The court concluded that the association was in charge at the general assembly meeting, 
had more resources than individual members, and thus was better able to make an 
investigation and ensure that the legal rules were interpreted correctly, ensuring that 
decisions were based upon the correct information. The Supreme Court emphasized the 
necessity that the association should carry the burden of proof in these matters, as this 
could work as prevention against future misuse from the association’s side. It is worth 
noticing in this case that the association’s perceived need for a higher majority came from 
a legal rule and not from its own constitution.193 
4.4.3 Applicability on NPAs  
Both the legislator and in legal literature one finds that the majority rule belongs to 
general principles of law.194 Nerep emphasizes that the majority principle and the 
principle of equal treatment belong to the most important general principles of law while 
Hemström make clear that the majority rule is applicable in all associations that is unless 
members has agreed on something else195 Johansson seem to perceive the majority rule as 
a minimum requirement for NPAs and adds that the majority rule can be used as a filler 
of the gaps in NPAs, this is in line with the legislator’s word in the preparatory work 
predating the Act on Religious Communities. 196  
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Case law makes clear that general principles of law are applicable on NPAs.197  Legal 
literature perceives the majority rule to be applicable on NPA’s internal relations.198  
The majority rule is also a fundamental feature of democracy and an expression for the 
opportunity members in NPAs has to participate in the association’s affairs. Thus, one 
can question if not the majority rule also originated in NPA’s. 199  
4.4.4 Conclusive remarks 
4.4.4.1 Is the majority rule applicable on an NPA’s general assembly 
meeting? 
It seems clear that the majority rule belong to the most important general principles of 
law which is applicable on all associations, unless something else has been put down in 
law or agreed upon in the constitution.  The majority rule is applicable on NPA’s internal 
relations and also general assembly meetings. Historical there are reasons to believe that 
the democratic tradition of issuing resolutions through majority votes in Swedish NPAs is 
older than the Swedish democracy. 
 
4.4.4.2 What implication does the general clauses have for a general 
assembly meeting 
For a General assembly meeting the majority rule is a minimum requirement which 
generally seems to imply that resolutions are made by a simple majority unless something 
else is required by law or in the constitution. Resolutions as serious changes to the 
constitution, disruption of the relationship between members and clear deviations from 
the aim of an NPA seem to require consent from all members. However, when consent 
from all members is required, it seems plausible that at least in a larger NPA, this might 
imply consent from all delegates at the general assembly meeting, since these represent 
9/10 of the members.  
 
According to NJA 2012 s 198, it is up to the association in question to make sure whether 
or not a decision requires a simple majority. Significant changes to an NPA’s objectives 
should require consent from all members. Resolutions aiming to discontinue activity, 
radically change the objective and nature of an NPA, drastically increase members’ fees 
or use the association’s money for purposes not in line with the NPA’s goal all seem to be 
significant changes.  
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4.4.4.3 When is it possible to deviate from the majority rule? 
Seeing that the majority rule belong to the same group as the principle of equal treatment 
one could expect that it would be possible to deviate from the majority rule occasionally 
with the consent of all members. However the right to deviate from the majority rule as a 
minimum rule appears not to be expressed in legal literature. Instead one finds that NPAs 
can adopt more comprehensive regulations like for example 2/3 majority and so on. 
4.5 Conflict of interest 
4.5.1 Content 
One finds the conflict of interest rules for the general assembly in FL 7:3, which in large 
part reflect ABL 7:46, where a member may not, in person or through a proxy, vote in 
respect of legal proceedings against him or her, his or her discharge from liability for 
damages or other obligations toward the association, or legal proceedings or a discharge 
as referred to in the first two matters in respect of another person, if the member in 
question possesses a particular interest that may conflict with the interests of the 
association. These provisions in respect of members might also apply to members' 
proxies.200 The perception of conflict of interest applicable to members’ proxies is shared 
by Samuelsson and Nerep who state that it is possible to extend the application of the 
conflict of interest rule in ABL 7:46, directly or analogously, to include all legal 
agreements that aim to establish, preserve, change, or terminate a legal agreement 
affecting economic rights and obligations between two or more participants.201  
 
For companies, breach of the conflict of interest rules might activate liability for 
damages, according to ABL 29:1. As elsewhere, one also finds here a certain overlap 
between the principle of equality, the general clauses, and conflict of interest, and one 
might get the impression that the principles also work as extensions of each other.202 This 
relationship is visible in that consent from all affected members seems to be able to 
render the conflict of interest rule void.203 The general clause in ABL 7:47 seem to cover 
up for the shortcomings of 7:46 when it comes to general assembly meetings.204 To a 
certain extent conflict of interest rules do not seem to apply to internal corporate 
matters.205When addressing internal corporate matters, conflict of interest rules do not 
hinder a person from voting; the person with the conflict of interest can also be present 
and express their opinion when the matter is discussed. 206 In cases of majority misuse 
regarding agreements, Johansson finds it more reasonable to apply the general clauses.207  
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The board of an NPA can issue motions and make recommendations to the general 
assembly meeting; in both these situations a possible conflict of interest situation at the 
board level will have an effect for the general assembly meeting. Seeing this it becomes 
interesting to understand in which situations conflict of interest can arise also in board 
meetings. FLs regulations partially reflect ABL 8:23 for board members; this is visible in 
FL 6:10, where one finds that neither a board member nor the administrative director may 
participate in a matter regarding an agreement between the board member and the 
association or in an agreement between the association and a third party, where the board 
member in question has an essential interest that may conflict with the interests of the 
company. A board member must not participate in decisions that in an obvious way affect 
him/her directly or indirectly whether that is in regard to their own working conditions, 
salary or so on. With decisions, one includes all legal binding agreements and also 
litigation or other legal proceedings between the board member and the association but 
also gifts to him or her from the association.208 Looking for guidance in corporate law, 
one finds that these rules are understood to be extensive and are thus also applicable to 
one-sided acts that are of importance for the formation of a contractual agreement, the 
change of an agreement, or the termination of an agreement.209 The main issue here might 
be whether the members with the conflicting interest could be in the majority, or if in a 
minority, have such an influence that their presence makes a difference. In practical 
terms, ABL 8:23a means that all questions about agreements with board members, close 
connections, or close companies are removed from the board to the general assembly.210 
A board cannot breach the conflict of interest rule in situations where the board presents a 
proposal to the general assembly without taking a stand.211 
4.5.2 Deviations 
At the general assembly meeting, a board member can only participate in votes regarding 
his or her own freedom from responsibility if such a right is given in the constitution. 
However, one can question whether this particular change in the constitution must be 
accepted by all or at least by a majority of the affected members and thus, not just by 
delegates. Johansson states that it is not possible to set aside conflict of interest rules with 
majority decisions, since all members’ voices must be heard in regard to these decisions. 
Thus one gets the impression that what he has in mind is that all members must be 
notified and allowed to make their voices heard, since the decision affects all members.212  
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It is not made clear whether a person who has a conflict of interest as chairman can lead a 
general assembly through discussions and voting on the particular question. Johansson is 
not very clear on this issue, in that he believes both that the person should be able to 
function as chairman as long the decision is made by acclamation and that the person 
does not utilize his casting vote; otherwise, he should find someone else to function as 
chairman even if he would have such a right.213  A member who has a conflicting interest 
could possibly influence the result of a vote just by their presence, because the members 
would take this presence into consideration when voting, and also because the mere 
presence would prevent freedom of expression and factual consideration. However, while 
this might not always apply to general assembly meetings, it seems reasonable that a 
member should always leave the room if it is a case where a conflict of interest could 
exist.214 
 
There don’t appear to be any recent cases from the Supreme Court that address the 
conflict of interest for NPAs. However, there are a few other cases addressing other 
associations, which will be briefly addressed below. 
 
The court in NJA 1981 s 1117 made clear that the conflict of interest rules in the ABLs 
exist to protect shareholders and not third party interests, since the rules presuppose a 
conflict of interest between the company and the shareholder. The court furthermore 
made clear that a conflict of interest cannot exist if board members with conflicting 
interests also own all shares in the company.215 
 
In NJA 1982 s 1, the Supreme Court found a breach of the then applicable conflict of 
interest rule section 86 in ABL of (1944:705). In this case, the chairman of the board, DM 
who was married to MM, issued a bond to his wife, who had worked for the company for 
some time but had agreed with her husband not to ask for a salary until the business went 
better. DM issued the bond after he experienced that the company was suffering 
economically and was to be sold. When considering what would be a breach of the 
conflict of interest rule, the Supreme Court based its conclusion on the following: Firstly, 
it was not clear that there existed an agreement prior to the issuing of the bond or if the 
bond represented an individual commitment for the company. Secondly, it was clear that 
when DM issued the bond, his interest could conflict with the company’s interest. 
Thirdly, even if the board had been granted freedom from responsibility, as in this case, 
this freedom did not cover the bond, whose existence was not revealed. Fourthly, MM 
should have known that DM was aware that the other owner, who eventually bought out 
DM before the company was sold, would not have agreed to the bond. Therefore, DM 
exceeded his authority when he issued the bond on behalf of the company.216 
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In NJA 2000 s 404, addressed among else in 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.3, there was also a question 
with regard to conflict of interest. In this case, the court, supported by the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court, stated that the conflict of interest rule in ABL 8:10 
(1975:1385) is only applicable to agreements, proceedings, and other types of claims and 
not to decision-making within a company’s organs.217 In NJA 2013 s 117 also addressed 
in 4.3.2, the Supreme Court made clear that the conflict of interest principle in 8:23 is 
only applicable to existing members and thus not to future members. This principle was 
also perceived applicable to economic associations. The Supreme Court in this case made 
clear that both the general clause and the conflict of interest paragraph in FL belongs to 
the group of dispositive rules in that they can be deviated from when all members agrees. 
If then, as here, all members of the NPA at a given point in time free the board from 
responsibility this would ban future members from making a claim. 218However according 
to NJA 2012 s 198 a board cannot be granted freedom from liability in regard to a matter 
that has not been revealed. 219 
4.5.3 Applicability on NPAs  
The court in NJA 2013 s 117 state that the main function of the conflict of interest 
principle and the general clause is to protect the minority. Above in regard to the general 
clause it was made clear that the aim of the general clause was to ensure that the majority 
not secured an unfair benefit at the cost of the minority or the NPA. The court in NJA 
1987 s 394 emphasized the importance for a minority in NPAs to enjoy protection against 
abuse from the majority.220 
 
In legal literature one finds that the conflict of interest principle is applicable on NPAs. 
In Hemström’s opinion, the conflict of interest regulations in FL are by analogy 
applicable to NPAs.221 Johansson also states that conflict of interest rules, at least to a 
certain extent, possibly could by analogy be applicable to NPAs.222 
 
Also in case law the general clauses and the conflict of interest, seem to belong to the 
group of general principles of law aimed at protecting a minority from abuse.223  
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4.5.4 Conclusive remarks 
4.5.4.1 Is the conflict of interest rule applicable on an NPA’s general 
assembly meeting? 
While the general clause target the resolution, the implication of the conflict of interest 
are more far reaching in that a board cannot make suggestion to the general assembly 
when there is a conflict of issue within the board. Furthermore the general clauses cannot 
hinder member of the board to vote on their own freedom from liability.  Thus without 
the applicability of the conflict of interest rule the minority of NPAs will enjoy a faulty 
protection toward abuse. The same applies to protection of third parties interest in that the 
best interest of the NPA cannot be secured when members are free to follow their own 
interest and not those of the NPA and the members they represent. 
 
Thus while there has not been much written about the conflict of interest rule in relation 
to NPAs it would be difficult to understand if it would not apply. In particular this applies 
since case law sort the conflict of interest principle among the general principles of law 
aimed at protecting a minority from abuse.  
4.5.4.2 What implication does the conflict of interest rule have for a 
general assembly meeting 
The implication of the conflict of interest rule on the general assembly meeting seems to 
be twofold. In the first category one finds the existence of conflict of interest situations 
which exist before the general assembly meeting but which influence the decision-
making.  Here the conflict of interest principle give that a board cannot make suggestions 
to the general assembly when there exist a conflict of interest situation within the same 
board. In situations where conflict of interest can be an issue for the board in the decision 
making in that particular issue it should per default be transferred to the general assembly.  
In the second category one find situations which arise at the general meeting. For general 
assemblies the conflict of interest rule seems to have implication for general assembly 
meetings mainly in question of liability. Thus a board member cannot vote for his/her 
own freedom from liability. In practical terms, a chairman cannot be a sitting chairman in 
matters that affect his or hers own liability. It seems plausible that in questions of 
liability, people should have the right to express themselves, but thereafter, it would be 
better for the association that they leave the room, depending on the situation. 
4.5.4.3 When is it possible to deviate from conflict of interest rule? 
It is possible to deviate from the conflict of interest rule when all members agree. This 
seeing the conflict of interest rules only target situations where one or more persons have 
an interest that can be in in conflict with the interest of the NPA. It might also be possible 
to deviate from the conflict of interest rule when all affected members agree. 
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5. Erroneous conduct and faulty 
contents 
One can differentiate between two types of error that can make a resolution unlawful. 
Firstly, there can be errors in the actual decision-making process, and then there can be 
errors in the content of an actual resolution.224  
Errors in process are perceived as errors in the formal procedures. When a decision is 
challenged based upon erroneous formal procedure, the claimant claims that the decision 
has not been made in due order. That is, it has not followed the decision-making process 
as put down in the constitution or the law, or it has been decided in a way that cannot 
reasonably be expected from the type of organization in question.225 It also seems that 
certain decisions that go against the fundamental principle of equality of status among 
members can belong to this category.226 In addition to what has already been said 
examples of formal errors include the members having not received documentation; the 
general meeting issue a resolution without the needed members present or there being a 
conflict of interest; unauthorized voting or authorized voters being denied their right to 
vote; changes in the constitution having been made without a majority decision; or 
otherwise being in violation of the constitution.227 
If a decision is challenged on the basis of its substantial contents, this means that the 
general assembly made a resolution they were not entitled to make or that the decision 
made was against the members’ interests as protected by the legal framework of 
associations’ general principles of the law or the constitution.228 In these cases, the 
meaning of the constitution can be under dispute, and Mallmén states that is reasonable to 
assume that when one interprets the constitution, one should utilize an objective method 
of interpretation that is based on the constitution’s actual wording but that also takes into 
consideration how the constitution in question has been understood previously, based 
upon existing praxis within the organization.229 Here it is the NPA’s responsibility to 
make sure that the rules are clear. Any unclearness could be interpreted in the member’s 
favor, since the NPA had the responsibility of preventing the situation from happening.230 
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5.1 Applicable rules of proceedings 
The legislator, legal literature, and case law all seem to agree upon the preexisting 
fundamental legal principles that give the members, the board, and the managing director 
the right to bring proceedings against an NPA before a court of general jurisdiction in 
order to set aside or amend a resolution that has not been adopted in due order or that 
contravenes the law or the constitution.231 This principle, visible in FL 7:17, might have 
originated from the Corpus juris civilis principle pacta sunt servanta in AvtL 1:1232 
General principles of law equal law and/or the constitution when it comes to 
proceedings.233 
The legal rules of proceedings in FL 7:17 seem to apply analogue unless the members 
have agreed to something else through the constitution.234 However, it does not seem 
plausible that it is possible to derogate the rules of proceedings by contract through the 
constitution without all members’ consent.235 
In situations where there is a question of a decision’s validity, Stattin argues that it makes 
most sense to apply AvtL’s invalidity rules. In a claim context, these rules can be applied 
in two ways, firstly, by the application of AvtL’s invalidity rules or secondly, by 
rendering a decision invalid on contractual grounds. In the first situation, no period of 
limitation applies. 236However, there seems to exist a difference between rules annulling 
rules within company laws and annulments based upon contractual law, since the first are 
strong annulment rules while the second, with the exception of AvtL 28, are weak.237  
One might argue that there is a certain overlap of legal framework of associations’ rules 
of proceedings and the invalidity clauses in contractual law. Since voting and resolutions 
made in a general assembly meeting, according to Swedish rules, are perceived as a one-
sided legal action sui generis, one can ask whether an NPA member might find situations 
where both are applicable.238 One can ask whether deliberate deceit (when the general 
assembly believe they have voted for something but the resolution has been twisted and 
does not reflect the perception of the general assembly in part or as a whole at the time of 
the vote) can be categorized under both AvtL and annulment rules.239 A fault must always 
be of significance in casu in order for the rules to apply.240 
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FL 7:17 differentiates between the general rules of proceedings and annulment rules.241 
Since not much has been said about the rules of proceedings in the legal literature dealing 
with NPAs, it seems reasonable again to resort to other types of associations for guidance.  
5.1.1 General rules of proceedings 
In addition to being applicable to resolutions that contravene the constitution, the general 
rules existing within the legal framework of associations are also applicable to resolutions 
aiming to change the constitution, that is, unless these are included in annulment cases. In 
these cases, Nial, addressing resolutions that conflict with the constitution within 
company law, exempts decisions that establish a constitutional future praxis.242 One can 
question whether or not most constitutional changes establish a future praxis. 
Faulty resolutions categorized under general rules of proceedings need to be challenged 
within a stipulated time in order to avoid the changes in question being implemented, and 
this applies even if this is not a majority decision according to the constitution or the 
law.243 There exists a prevailing perception that the standard three-month timeframe (from 
the date of resolution) for commencing general proceedings in both FL 7:17 and ABL 
7:51 is not analogue applicable to NPAs.244RH 2012:33 confirmed that a general claim 
for amendment can be filed after three months by a member or a group of members from 
an NPA; however, it was also made clear that if the claimant does not act within a 
reasonable timeframe, the member(s) will lose their chance to file a claim.245 What is 
considered to be a reasonable timeframe, one could assume, would depend on the 
particular circumstances of the case. Seeing that in this case the claim was made more 
than six years after the date of the resolution, and the Court of Appeal stated that the 
members, having been informed of the decision years ago, had remained passive for too 
long.246 
 
Breaches of the general clause and the principle of equality both come under the general 
rules of proceedings.247  
The normal outcome of a dispute is the revocation of the contested resolution, since the 
court may not at its own discretion alter a decision’s content.  
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Modification of a decision may only be done if it can be determined what content the 
decision rightfully should have had, for instance, where the general assembly voted on 
two proposals, and where the one proposal declared adopted was not the one preferred by 
the majority.248  
Stattin, dealing with ABL’s rules, informs us that the general rules are not limited only to 
general assembly resolutions but apply also to other decisions of a similar nature. He 
suggests that it is possible to utilize the general rules of proceedings when one would like 
to bring an action regarding decisions made by the board or another corporate body that 
can make binding decisions on behalf of the company. That is, one can do so if the board 
or corporate body have received authority in the matter either through explicit or implicit 
delegation and unless, firstly, the decision should have been made by the general 
assembly according to law or the constitution but has been made by the board, or 
secondly, if the decision according to the principles of nonperforming exclusive General 
assembly  competences should be taken by the general meeting but has been taken by the 
board of directors or other corporate bodies.249  
 
In the first exception, one finds a usurpation of the general assembly’s competence 
according to the law or the constitution, which means that the resolution/agreement/action 
is not legally binding and can induce tort action, while in the second case, the 
resolution/agreement/action will bind the company. 250 
 
When considering an extended application of the general rules of proceedings, Stattin 
puts forward three fundamental principles for analogies, firstly, that the analogy serves to 
realize the same purpose as its stipulated intention, secondly, that the legal area and rules 
enable an analogy, and thirdly, that the situational context suggest the possibility of an 
analogy.251  
 
The right to take action according to the general rules is to a certain extent unrelated to a 
given shareholder’s action at the general assembly; however, it also seems to be that 
under certain conditions, one can lose this right, that is, by voting yes or by giving one’s 
consent.252 A member can give his/her consent before the decision, under or after the 
decision or in the form of implicit acquiescence. Implicit acquiescence can consist in the 
member’s participation in the enforcement of the decision or, as advised in the legal 
literature, the member’s participation in making decisions based upon the faulty 
resolution.253 However, Stattin suggests that participation in decision making cannot be 
enough; the member in question has to actively vote in accordance. Thus, if a shareholder 
refrains from voting, he or she is close to being perceived as not being present at the 
actual meeting.  
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Since those who are not present have not lost their right to put actions forward, Stattin is 
reluctant limit their right.254 In addition there can exist qualified cases where faulty or 
deceitful information has been provided and acted upon.255 
 
If a member fails to act within the given timeframe stipulated, he or she loses the right to 
put action forward. The period of limitation normally starts when the faulty decision has 
been made, unless it could not be assumed that the shareholder(s) knew that the general 
assembly conducted a meeting and that at this meeting, decisions could be made or were 
made that could affect the shareholders.256However, if one did not participate at the 
general assembly meeting, or if there was deceit involved either in the protocol or at the 
meeting, the time period would first start when the shareholder got to know that the 
decision was made. According to Stattin, this is when the decision can be seen as 
received by the member.257  
5.1.2 Annulments 
According to the legal literature, rules of annulment for the general assembly exist in 
accordance with the principles set down in FL and ABL.258 
 
The rules of annulment apply when a resolution, through its creation or content, contains 
such a serious breach of the law or of the constitution that it is considered nonexistent.259  
 
In FL 7:17, third part, there are three types of situations where one can request an 
annulment of a general assembly resolution in court.260  
 
The first situation is when a resolution has been made that is against mandatory legal 
rules, and the resolution is such that it cannot be adopted, notwithstanding the unanimous 
consent of all members. Here one finds a type of rule that is put down in order to protect 
other than the members, whether they are new members, creditors, or employees of the 
organization. An example of this type of rule is the rules governing the composition of 
NPA’s organs, as well as their authorizations and responsibilities.261 It might also look 
like situations involving the usurpation of power belong here.262 
 
The second situation becomes activated if consent to the resolution was required from all 
or some particular affected members, and no such consent was granted.263  
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An example of these decisions are those that are against certain clauses within the 
constitution, 264  but possibly also when the constitution is to be amended in or from the 
same session where the vote has been taken seeing this affects all members.  
 
There seems to be a confusing disunity in the legal literature in regard to whether 
resolutions made in disagreement with the principle of equality and/or the general clauses 
can fall under the second annulment rule or not. Rodhe states that decisions against 
mandatory rules such as the principle of equality or conflict of interest will never be 
valid, since no limitation exists on the timeframe for making a claim.265 According to 
Stattin, in Nerep’s view, the second annulment rule should be interpreted extensively to 
include all rules that require all members’ consent, while Stattin emphasizes the need for 
a restrictive interpretation, since both the history of the particular rule and its function and 
purpose indicate that it should be limited only to include such particular rules within the 
constitution that demand positive consent from all shareholders or that are particularly 
required by law.266 This perception is also shared by Andersson and Pehrson, who 
emphasize the need not to damage the practical economic life of the company by keeping 
decisions hanging in the air.267  
 
Andersson and Pehrson perceive a certain disunity in Nerep and Samuelsson, who both 
appear to say that decisions in conflict with the principle of equality and the general 
clauses are categorized under the annulment rule but also under the general claim rules.268                                                                                     
 
In the third situation, a notice to attend the general meeting has not been given, or 
significant parts of the provisions governing the notice to attend the general meeting have 
not been complied with. In this case, there has been a serious deviation from the notice 
rules in FL chapter 7, sections 7 and 8. FL does not specify what serious deviations are.269 
However, this should imply that if all members have been given a fair chance to 
participate in the general meeting, or if the procedural error committed has not affected 
the outcome of the resolution under dispute, a serious deviation from the notice rules has 
not happened.270 However, according to chapter 7, section 9 (error of notice), this type of 
error can be resolved with all affected members’ consent.271  
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An example of a situation where a serious deviation from procedural rules can render a 
resolution void is when a general assembly makes a decision in a matter that the members 
have not been previously notified of and which not all members have agreed to discuss.272 
Situations where the chairman of the general assembly meeting states that the general 
assembly has made a different decision than the decision the general assembly actually 
made might also pending the situation belong here.273 In situations where procedural rules 
have been seriously breached, it might become a situation where the resolution cannot 
even be named a resolution.274 Legal theory differentiates between situations that render 
one single decision void and situations where all decisions can be considered void, that is, 
where the general assembly meeting is considered not to have occurred.275  
 
In NJA 1970 s 394, which actually is an NPA expulsion case, the Supreme Court made 
clear that the board acted outside their power of authority when they made a decision to 
exclude a member, who also was a member of the board, since it is the general assembly 
who should decide who should be on the board. The Supreme Court stated that this 
decision was against the fundamentals of the constitution.276 
5.2 Exclusions 
Many of the NPA disputes taken to court and that reach The Supreme Court of Sweden 
seem to deal with the issue of exclusion. This might not be strange, since the act of 
exclusion places a member beyond the outer boundary of the membership organization. 
In the category of exclusions, one also finds denials of membership.277In the cases I have 
looked at, the exclusion decisions were made either by the general assembly or by the 
board. While it is possible to bring proceedings against an NPA because of an expulsion 
on formal procedure or on substantial content grounds, expulsions do not fall under the 
rules of proceedings in FL 7:17 (see 2.4.2).278 Seeing the amount of material and the 
complexity of the issue, it has been necessary not to proceed further in this subject at this 
time. There are extensive works on the subject of expulsions from NPAs; see, for 
example, Hemström, 1977 and Petersén, Maria’s essay discussing expulsion from sport 
associations.279 
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6. Conclusive remarks 
This research has made clear that the legal framework of NPA general assembly 
resolutions consists of (1) mandatory rules that an NPA must include in its constitution in 
order to become a legal entity, (2) the implications of freedom of association, and (3) 
general principles of law applicable to all associations. This chapter will sum up these 
findings and conclude. 
6.1 Requirements for becoming a legal entity 
This investigation has revealed that in order to become a legal entity an NPA must have a 
hierarchical organizational structure and must have adopted a formal constitution of 
certain completeness. 
6.1.1 The whereabouts of a hierarchical organization 
In order to become a legal entity, an NPA must have a general assembly and a board 
selected by that assembly. Since functionality determines what constitutes a board, the 
board of an NPA might consist of only one person. However, the board must carry the 
normal responsibilities of a board and perform the same tasks as a board, namely being 
responsible for the affairs of the NPA and promoting the NPA’s interests.  
An NPA whose constitution allows for a board and which normally has one, but are 
temporary without, can for a limited period be perceived by the court to be a non-
complete legal entity, which can be a respondent a court case. 
The board must be subordinate and accountable to the general assembly and must be 
granted freedom from liability by the general assembly. While the general assembly can 
select a board, the board cannot select a general assembly or the delegates to it. The 
general assembly can delegate extended authority to the board to a certain extent. 
6.1.2 A formal constitution  
An NPA must have adopted a formal constitution in order to be considered a legal entity. 
However, under certain circumstances, such as when a section of an trade association or  
labor market organization starts to act more and more on its own so that the power of the 
NPA is decentralized and the section’s ability to make its own decisions increases, there 
could be situations that resemble AD 1972:1, in which a section without its own 
constitution, although regulated in the parent association constitution, was perceived to be 
a legal entity on its own.  
Verbal agreements and internal customs might, to a certain extent, fill the gaps when it 
comes to praxises but cannot replace a written constitution of certain completeness. 
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6.1.3 Necessary rules in a constitution of certain completeness  
In order for a constitution to be of certain completeness, the constitution must include the 
association’s name, the NPA’s aim and reveal how decisions concerning its affairs are 
made.  
The constitution must specify the aim of the association. The aim must be detailed and 
clear enough to allow identification of the NPA’s particularity and enable members and 
third parties to relate to the aim. In order for the board to be granted freedom from 
liability and to assure that the general assembly stays within the aim, an evaluation of 
conduct based on the aim must be possible.  
Based on KamR 3690-12, the constitution should delineate when decisions are to be 
made, by whom they will be made, and how they will be made. The constitution must 
state what constitutes the general assembly, how general assembly delegates are selected 
by the members, the frequency and time of general assembly meetings, and the process 
by which resolutions are made. The constitution must specify if and when rules stricter 
than majority rule are applicable. The constitution must also reveal how changes to the 
constitution are to be made by the general assembly. It must also be clear about how the 
board is selected by the general assembly and for how long a period of time. The 
constitution must indicate how many will be on the board and give the rules for 
substitutes. Information must be given in regard to how decisions are made on the board 
in cases when rules stricter than majority rule apply. The constitution must indicate if 
there are any limitations or expansions of the board’s authority to make decisions. It must 
also include rules in regard to accounting. Third parties should have information in regard 
to the accounting year and the timing of the adoption of the accounts. The constitution 
must therefore as a minimum include information about the annual general meetings. 
Rules  regarding claims and extraordinary general assembly meetings should also be 
included in the constitution, but analogies based on FL can probably function as a filler of 
the gaps in the absence of clauses. It seems plausible that the constitution must advise in 
regard to decisions about dissolution.  
 
In principle, then, in a constitution of certain completeness, the NPA must regulate 
controlling functions (accounting), determining functions (general assembly meetings), 
and executive functions (the board). 
6.2 The implication of freedom of association 
It has been made clear that freedom of association is not to be perceived as freedom from 
the law. Instead, the freedom of association seems to enable members to establish an 
association with an aim of their liking and to do this without adhering to rules in regard to 
the necessity of profit.  
However, once an association has been established as a legal entity the members are 
compelled to not deviate beyond what can be expected from the aim.  
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In addition, the freedom of association enables a nonprofit association that would like to 
become a legal entity to choose among the available forms of legal entities. All legal 
entity forms come with pre-set rules, and this also applies to the form of NPA.  
6.2.1.1 Freedom of association and general assembly resolutions 
The implication of freedom of association seems to be that NPAs are by default open 
associations. This means that if an NPA does not want to be an open association, this 
should be spelled out in its constitution. However, the question arises whether a general 
assembly can deny someone membership based on internal praxis or type-specific 
custom. Nowadays, in the absence of rulings to guide, this might very well be the case. It 
also seems less likely that an NPA can consist only of the persons who established it, but 
again the absence of cases makes this difficult to determine. A general assembly cannot 
set down rules or issue resolutions that deny members the right to leave the association. 
The freedom of association also seems to limit the right of a general assembly to 
automatically assign members to a new section of for example an labor market 
organization or trade association or to enforce stricter rules than were previously agreed 
on without consent of the affected members. The freedom of association protects people 
from being forced into joining an association. 
6.3 General principles of law applicable to general 
assembly meetings 
This analysis has revealed that as a minimum the general clause and the principles of 
equal treatment, majority rule, and conflict of interest are all applicable to the NPA 
general assembly meeting. 
The general clauses, most likely included in the principle of equal treatment, the principle 
of equal treatment and majority rule seem to have originated in NPAs. Thus, praxises 
previously set down in law for companies and economic associations seem to have 
emerged in NPAs but in a more democratic form. They are more democratic because the 
possibilities for deviating from these principles were probably more limited than what can 
be seen in associations with an economic aim today. 
While majority rule functions as the basis for a democratic decision-making process, the 
general clauses, the principle of equal treatment and that of conflict of interest together 
form the minority protection rules. These rules are primarily intended to protect members 
from abuse, but in practicality they also protect the association itself and third parties 
since without this protection neither the association nor third parties can ensure 
continuous activity in the interest of the association. 
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6.4 The effect of applicable general principles of law 
on the decision- making process 
6.4.1 The principle of equal treatment  
It does not seem possible to deviate from the principle of equal treatment when it comes 
to the members’ right to participate and vote at a general assembly meeting. Thus, all 
members of NPAs must necessarily enjoy the same right to participate in the management 
of the association’s affairs at the general assembly meeting. In order to do so, each 
member must receive the same information as other members in regard to when the 
meeting will be. This notification must include information about where and when the 
meeting will take place and must be received in due time before the meeting. The time 
and the place of the general assembly meeting must be selected with the intention of 
securing the participation of all members. The principle of equality should also ensure 
that members have access to the same information at approximately the same time.  
In order for members to participate in the meeting, they must have access to the necessary 
documents needed to prepare themselves. Therefore, all members must have access to or 
receive an agenda in due time before the general assembly meeting. This agenda must 
have a fixed order of the matters to be addressed at the general meeting. The order of 
cases cannot be changed without the approval of all members or delegates present at the 
meeting.  
The general assembly can consist of NPA members or delegates. If the general assembly 
consists of delegates, these delegates must have been selected by the members. Each 
member/delegate has one vote and an equal right to have his or her voice heard at the 
general assembly meeting. Following the reasoning of Johansson, a member cannot be 
denied the right to have his or her motion heard at a general assembly. 
In order for all members to enjoy the same right to participate in the general assembly 
meeting, members who are not present at the meeting must be given a fair opportunity to 
bring forth proceedings in response to faulty resolutions.  
6.4.2 Majority rule 
For the general assembly meeting, majority rule is a minimum requirement, which 
implies that resolutions are made by simple majority unless law or the constitution 
demands more. Serious decisions such as changes in the nature, aim, or purpose of 
operations stated in the constitution or clear deviations from the aim of an NPA seem to 
require consent from at least 9/10 of all members.  
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6.4.3 Conflicts of interest 
The implication of the conflict of interest rule on the general assembly meeting seems to 
be twofold. In the first category are conflict of interest situations which arise before the 
general assembly meeting has taken place, but which influence its decision-making.  
Here the conflict of interest principle means that a board cannot make suggestions to the 
general assembly when a conflict of interest situation exists within the same board. In 
situations where a conflict of interest can be an issue for the board in making a decision, 
that particular issue should by default be transferred to the general assembly.  
In the second category are situations that arise at the general meeting. For general 
assemblies, the conflict of interest rule seems to apply mainly to questions of liability. 
Thus, a board member cannot vote on his or her own freedom from liability. Then in 
practical terms it seems likely that a chairman cannot be a sitting chairman in matters that 
affect his or her own liability. In such situations, people should have the right to express 
themselves, but it would be better for the association if they leave the room after that. 
Since the conflict of interest rules only target situations where one or more persons have 
an interest that may be in conflict with the interest of the NPA, it may be possible to 
deviate from the conflict of interest rule when all affected members agree. 
6.5 The effect of applicable general principles of law 
on the material content of a general assembly 
resolution 
6.5.1 The principle of equal treatment  
The principle of equal treatment ensures that members are dealt with fairly. However, 
while unfair actions or decisions and improper favoritism or discrimination against 
certain members are prohibited, a general assembly might occasionally issue resolutions 
that deal differently with certain members when there are objective reasons for doing so. 
When considering what would count as objective, justifiable reasons, one should take into 
account the relative strength of the reasons provided, the number and frequency of 
deviation, the period, and the actual member advantages or disadvantages in comparison 
to other members in a particular case. Consideration should be given to the possible need 
for stronger reasons for deviation from the principle of equal treatment in NPAs, so the 
need to aim for the most eligible solution might be higher. Still, all members cannot 
expect to benefit alike from all resolutions. 
While it is possible to set aside the constitutional principle of equal treatment with the 
consent of all the members, one can but wonder to what extent this can apply, given the 
strength of the principle, which is a long-standing custom, and the possibility of rendering 
a constitutional clause void.  
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6.5.2 The general clause 
The general clause ensures that the general assembly cannot adopt resolutions that aim at 
providing someone else, even a member, with an undue advantage at the expense of the 
NPA; nor can the general assembly issue resolutions aimed at providing an undue 
advantage for some members to the disadvantage of other members. Resolutions whose 
content contradicts the aim or purpose of operations might also fall under the general 
clause.   
 
In the context of the general assembly meeting, it seems possible to set aside the general 
clause with the consent of all affected members at a given time. There must be sufficient 
reasons for setting aside the principle. In order for the general clause to be set aside, the 
resolution in question must not aim to enable an undue advantage to a member to other 
members disadvantage or provide an undue advantage to someone else at members or the 
association’s disadvantage. If there are sufficient reasons for doing so, a resolution setting 
aside the general clause with the consent of all affected members can be revoked.  
6.6 Options for proceedings in response to a faulty 
resolution 
Fundamental legal principles give members, the board, and the managing director the 
right to initiate proceedings against an NPA before a court of general jurisdiction in order 
to set aside or amend a resolution that has not been adopted in due order or that 
contravenes the law, the constitution, or general principles of law. In doing this, one can 
to certain extent draw on an analogy with the legal rules of proceedings in FL and ABL 
or the generally weaker annulment rules of AvtL. The fault must be significant in casu in 
order for the rules to apply.  
The right to take action exists unless members have voted in favor of the faulty resolution 
or given their consent. A member can give his or her consent before the decision, under 
the decision, or after the decision in the form of implicit acquiescence. Implicit 
acquiescence can consist of the member’s participation in the enforcement of the faulty 
resolution or in making decisions based on a faulty resolution. 
The normal outcome of a dispute is the revocation of the contested resolution. 
Modification can only be made if it can be determined what content the decision 
rightfully should have had.  
If a member fails to act within a given time frame, he or she loses the right to put an 
action forward. For members participating in the actual general assembly, the period of 
limitation, depending on the situation, can be expected to start when the faulty resolution 
is made. For other members, the period seems to start when they become aware that the 
protocol is available. 
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It may be possible to derogate the rules of proceedings by contract with the consent of all 
members. However, it does not seem to be possible to derogate the rules of proceedings 
to such extent that members are not able to exercise their right to participate in the affairs 
of the NPA. The limitation must be reasonable and still allow all members, both delegates 
and other members, to initiate proceedings. 
6.6.1 General rules of proceedings 
Under the general rules of proceedings are all the following situations with the exception 
of what is said in section 6.6.2 below. 
 
Faulty resolutions categorized under the general rules of proceedings need to be 
challenged within a stipulated time in order to avoid changes in question being 
implemented. It seems clear that the time frame of three months required in FL does not 
apply to NPAs. What counts as stipulated time is not clear, but six years is too long a 
time. The Supreme Court in RH 2012:33 set forth the concept of reasonable time. It 
seems plausible that what counts as reasonable would depend on the particular situation. 
 
Generally, changes in the constitution made in disagreement with the procedure set forth 
in the constitution count as formal errors and can be considered under general rules of 
proceedings. It seems clear that a resolution issued in disagreement with the principles of 
equality and conflict of interest can be faulted. It is not entirely clear which rules apply. It 
seems plausible that non-intentional, non-regular, and non-serious faults fall under 
general rules of proceedings. It is unclear whether breaches of majority rule fall under 
general rules of proceedings or annulment rules. (See the discussion of these principles in 
section 6.6.2.) It seems clear that when the constitution or the law has requirements in 
regard to which majority should apply, deviations from these requirements fall under 
general rules of proceedings.  
 
Generally, resolutions whose content contradicts the constitution count as material errors 
and are governed by general rules of proceedings. It seems clear that a resolution whose 
content contravenes the principle of equality and the general clause can be faulted. 
However, it is not entirely clear which rules apply. It seems plausible that non-intentional, 
non-regular, and non-serious faults fall under the general rules of proceedings. (For 
discussion see 6.6.2.) 
 
It seems clear that resolutions that directly or indirectly force someone to join an 
association or that deny members the right to leave the association can be faulted in 
accordance with ex. NJA 1958 s 438 and NJA 1982 s 853. Because of the delimitation of 
this essay, it will not address this issue any further given the need for careful discussion 
of expulsion cases. 
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6.6.2 Annulment rules 
According to the legal literature, rules of annulment exist in accordance with principles in 
FL and ABL. Rules of annulment apply to any resolution that through its creation or 
content contains such a serious breach of the law or the constitution that the resolution 
can be considered non-existing. 
 
FL 7:17 differs according to three different situations in which annulment rules can be 
activated.  
 
(1) The first situation involves rules that aim to protect people other than the members, 
whether they are new members, creditors, or employees of the organization. The literature 
mentions rules governing the composition of NPA organs as well as their authorization 
and responsibilities. These relate to usurpation of power and include resolutions that 
cannot be adopted even with the consent of all members. While the legal literature is 
silent on the matter, it seems that certain breaches of majority rule fit into this group. 
Although Hemström and others mention nondemocratic NPAs, it does not seem possible 
for such an association to exist as a legal entity in the form of an NPA. Due to the 
combination of mandatory requirements for becoming an NPA in the first place and the 
general principles of law, it might seem that nondemocratic nonprofit associations must 
choose to adopt a form of legal entity other than that of an NPA. Becoming an NPA 
activates a certain set of expectations, one of which is majority rule.  This may apply 
more to resolutions that address constitutional rules than to the question of a non-
intentional minority ruling. Even though there is a lack of case law and support in the 
legal literature, it does not seem unreasonable to believe that a resolution mistakenly 
issued with less than a simple majority should be claimed to be in accordance with the 
general rules of proceedings.  
 
(2) In the second situation, consent to the resolution was required from all the members or 
from the affected members, but no such consent was granted. While there may appear to 
be disunity in the legal literature regarding how to classify such a situation, this might not 
necessarily be the case. Given the importance of an NPAs aim as both a tool of 
identification and a means of evaluation as well as a guide to the establishment of the 
contractual relationship in the first place, it seems that if an organ of an NPA is going to 
undertake actions that are clearly foreign to the aims or objectives for operations, this 
would require the consent of all the members. Based on what has already been said (see 
2.4.3, 3.5.2.2 and 4.4.4.2), a constitutional change in the aim without the consent of all 
members or the undertaking of a clearly foreign action should be governed by the 
annulment rules. Seeing that this will most likely be a resolution that can be categorized 
as a breach of the general clause, such breaches should fall under the second annulment 
clause. This perception is in line with Rodhe, who considers both the general clause and 
the principle of equal treatment to be under the umbrella of equal treatment. Deviations 
from the principle of equal treatment might be categorized as annulment cases in 
situations involving members’ right to participate and vote at a general assembly meeting. 
Rodhe also states that situations that violate the principle of conflict of interest must 
follow the annulment rules.   
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Deviation from the conflict of interest principle is possible if all the members agree. 
However, in some cases there may be sufficient reasons to set aside consent.  
 
In some cases where the general assembly accepts a proposal put forward by the board 
the conflict of interest situation might be of such a serious nature that the resolution, 
therefore, can be perceived as non-existing. In conclusion, then one might infer that the 
perceived disunity in Nerep and Samuelson indicates greater complexity when it comes to 
the question of whether fundamental principles come under the rules of annulment or not. 
It might turn out that in the case of single or occasional mistakes these situations, 
depending on their nature, should follow the general rules of proceedings while 
intentional, regular, and serious breaches might activate annulment rules. 
 
(3) In the third group are serious breaches in formal procedure (e.g., situations where 
notice to attend the general meeting has not been given or significant parts of the 
provision governing the notice have not been complied with). However, if members have 
been given a fair possibility of participating and voting or if the procedural error has not 
affected the outcome in the resolution under dispute, a serious deviation from notice rules 
has not occurred. This group also includes situations where the general assembly issues a 
resolution concerning a matter about which members have not been notified and which 
not all members have agreed to discuss. It also seems that situations where those who 
have voted were not members can be included. In some situations, all decisions made can 
be considered void because the general assembly meeting suffered from such serious 
errors that it is considered as non-existing. 
6.7 Final comments 
This research has revealed that even in the absence of law there is law. The deep 
principles of law that regulate NPAs might not always be visible for association 
members. Therefore, this essay represents an attempt to identify which rules apply and to 
make those rules visible. It is my personal view that when the rules are visible, then 
everyone knows how to play the game.  
Because of the lack of case law and the limitations of the legal literature dealing with the 
legal framework of nonprofit associations, some of the findings of this investigation may 
be surprising: This analysis showed that in order for an association to become a legal 
entity in the form of an NPA, it must have a hierarchical structure with a board and a 
general assembly. The NPA must conduct annual general meetings or similar. The NPA 
must be of a democratic nature.  The NPA is not at liberty to abandon majority rule. The 
freedom of association that a legal entity has to decide internal matters is, in practically, 
quite limited in its power. This limitation, however, is not perceived as a limitation by 
legal authorities, but mainly as minority protection rules intended to protect members and 
third parties against abuse. The effect of the principle of equal treatment is profound. And 
finally, probably in particular because of the more democratic nature of NPAs, their 
members have extensive rights to take actions in response to faulty resolutions. 
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